Economic viability of small-scale irrigation systems in the context of state withdrawal: the Arabie Scheme in the Northern Province of South Africa

Abstract

The reduction of state presence in irrigation and the transfer of management from government agencies to farmers or farming communities has become a widespread phenomenon, in response to the dual problem of low irrigation performance and constraints to public funding. The underlying principle is to encourage farmers and local communities to take responsibility for the management of local resources, and thereby limit external interventions to the provision information and institutional support services. As most of the schemes in question were not primarily designed for farmer management, experiences worldwide show a mixed picture of positive and negative results. The case of South Africa has recently received attention, as the few pilot schemes, especially in the Northern Province, do not seem to hold much promise of success. Current discussions on the subject raise a lot of issues and hypotheses about the subject of irrigation management transfer to farmers. The paper is an attempt to test some of these hypotheses in the African context, using the Arabie Scheme as a case study.

Exploring the need and suitability of The green revolution in South Africa

“…However, key constraints such as poor management (50% of the cases), water inadequacies (13%), conflict (12%) and theft (7%) have limited the impact of this initiative. Bembridge (2000), Kamara et al (2001) and Shah et al (2002) further came to the same conclusion that human (capacity) and social (institutional) resource problems have further stifled the efforts of revitalizing smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa. Such poor attempts to revitalize the irrigation schemes already mean that successfully adopting the HYVs of the Green Revolution will not yield positive results as these cultivars require large and regular quantities of water.…”

Options for Operation and Maintenance Partnerships - A Case Study of Rupike Irrigation Scheme, Zimbabwe

“…Postponing maintenance leads to reduced efficiency of the irrigation system, and during a crisis situation, generally the problem faced is more complex to resolve technically and more funds have to be spent than had the maintenance works been carried out on a regular basis (Biswas, 1984). Financing O&M is linked to sustainability in that, the ability of the scheme to generate sufficient income to satisfy the household income expectations of the irrigators, and cover basic operational and maintenance costs of the irrigation infrastructure determines the viability of an irrigation scheme (Kamara et al, 2001). Abernethy (2002) and Oriola (2012) argued that funding of recurrent costs of operation, maintenance and management for existing users of irrigation schemes through O&M partnerships is one of the ways private investment can be directed in agricultural water.…”

Smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa: A review of knowledge generated by the Water Research Commission

“…Among the primary constraints identified by extension staff on 164 of the 302 smallholder schemes, poor management topped the list (50% of the cases); followed by infrastructural problems (15%); water inadequacies (13%); conflict (12%); and theft (7%). This suggests that human (capacity) and social (institutional) resource problems were at the heart of the below-expected performance of smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa identified by nearly all assessments that were made (Bembridge, 1997;Bembridge, 2000;Kamara et al, 2001;Shah et al, 2002;Machete et al, 2004;iSeneke Developments, 2004;Tlou et al, 2006;Speelman et al, 2008;Yokwe, 2009;Mnkeni et al, 2010). Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of the command area of smallholder irrigation schemes.…”

“…Among schemes, the position of the scheme in relation to markets appeared to be the key factor that determined the balance between subsistence and commercial production on 1 ha to 2 ha plots (Bembridge and Sebotja, 1992;Kamara et al, 2001;Machete et al, 2004). In some instances, the position of the scheme in relation to markets was purely a spatial factor, with distance to the nearest urban centre and state of the roads linking the scheme to that centre as the key factors, because marketing of produce was done mostly by street traders and 'bakkie' (small van) traders (Van Averbeke, 2008;Magingxa et al, 2009).…”