Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual‐Level Analysis

Anderson, Cameron D.

doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00194.x

Cited by 187 publications

(156 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…as a key factor in performance-based voting (Anderson 2000(Anderson , 2006Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000;Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002;Powell and Whitten 1993;Sanders 2000;Stein 1990;van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007;Wlezien 2004). The question remains as to whether lessening the clarity of responsibility conventionally argued to exist in the first-pastthe-post majoritarian systems alters the attribution of blame, offering a rich set of opportunities for comparative research.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy and Government Performance: Holding Incumbents Accountable in English Local Governments

Boyne¹,

James²,

John³

et al. 2009

The Journal of Politics

151

115

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The link between government performance and support for incumbents is a key mechanism of accountable government. We model the vote share of incumbent administrations in local government as proportional and nonproportional responses to public service performance. We evaluate the models using a panel data set covering performance and elections from 2001 to 2007 in English local governments where an incumbent party or coalition was up for reelection. We control for the previous vote, whether the incumbent administration is of the national governing party, and local economic conditions. We find evidence for a nonproportional, performance threshold hypothesis, which implies that voters' behavior is affected by clear gradations of performance. Only the difference between low performance and at least mediocre performance matters. There is no reward for high performance. Instead our findings suggest negativity bias in the relationship between performance and electoral support for incumbents.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy and Government Performance: Holding Incumbents Accountable in English Local Governments

Boyne¹,

James²,

John³

et al. 2009

The Journal of Politics

151

115

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Em certas cir-cunstâncias, especialmente em governos onde há maior distribuição das atribuições entre diferentes partidos e grupos, há razões para que o cidadão mais sofisticado deixe de responsabilizar exclusivamente um candidato específico pela situação da economia (Gomez & Wilson 2008) 4 . Além disso, os eleitores mais sofisticados podem também levar em conta o impacto de fatores que em alguma medida escapam ao controle dos governantes, e que têm a ver com a dinâmica do mercado internacional (Anderson 2006). Por fim, outra razão mais simples pela qual os eleitores mais politicamente sofisticados podem simplesmente ignorar a economia ao votarem é a de que eles são justamente os mais propensos a basearem-se nas clivagens partidárias e ideológicas do sistema político (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996).…”

Section: Os Requisitos Cognitivos Do Voto Econômico E O Problemaunclassified

Voto econômico retrospectivo e sofisticação política na eleição presidencial de 2002

Pereira¹

2014

Rev. Sociol. Polit.

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RESUMOEste artigo aborda o tema do voto econômico a partir da perspectiva da desigualdade de sofisticação política entre os eleitores.Diversos estudos mostram que os eleitores brasileiros tendem a se basear na economia para votar e avaliar os presidentes. Essas evidências algumas vezes servem de suporte para a afirmação de que, mesmo não utilizando os partidos, os rótulos ideológicos e outras questões politicamente relevantes como referências para suas escolhas, o eleitorado de massa no Brasil seria capaz de tomar decisões criteriosas na política. Utilizando dados de pesquisa de painel coletados ao longo de 2002 em Caxias do Sul e Juiz de Fora, o artigo testa até que ponto o efeito da avaliação retrospectiva da economia (tanto do país quanto pessoal) sobre o voto para presidente depende do nível de sofisticação política do respondente. Os resultados mostram que a avaliação da economia tende a ser uma opinião instável ao longo do período analisado, e tem impacto sobre a escolha do candidato a presidente apenas entre os eleitores mais politicamente sofisticados. As implicações dos achados são discutidas e aponta-se para a relevância de se levar em conta o impacto da desigualdade de sofisticação política entre os eleitores no entendimento da dinâmica das eleições e da opinião pública no Brasil.

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“…between local and central authorities). A crossnational analysis has found, for example, that the existence of a federal structure does not pose as great a problem for clarity of responsibility for economic policy as does the substantive devolution of fiscal powers to regional authorities (Anderson, 2006). A unitary system with decentralized fiscal powers does more to obscure economic reponsibility than a federal system with centralized fiscal powers.…”

Section: A-3 Misattributed Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Intermediate Conditions of Democratic Accountability: A Response to Electoral Skepticism

Maloy

2015

PaG

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Attempts to respond to "democratic deficits" in modern constitutional republics must contend with the broad scholarly trend of electoral skepticism. While generally casting doubt on periodic competitive elections' suitability as vehicles of accountability, electoral skepticism does not necessarily entail an absolute devaluation of elections. Some normative and empirical research responds to this trend by refocusing attention on values other than popular power, such as civil peace, which might be served by periodic competitive elections. Another response short of abandoning the value of popular power, however, is to draw out possibilities for institutional design from the restricted conditions under which previous study has found electoral accountability to be plausible or likely. This second task requires an empirically informed exercise in political theory. Pursuing it in a programmatic and policy-relevant way requires descending from the grand, systemic level of constitutional structures and electoral formulae to intermediate (or middle-range) institutional conditions of accountability, such as rules about parties, campaigns, and election administration. My analysis reinterprets principal-agent models to develop four general types of crucial condition for electoral accountability, and then ramifies this scheme by reference to recent empirical research. The result is a "top ten" list of specific institutional factors that could be theoretically decisive in helping or hindering electoral accountability. These ten conditions could guide future research designs and reform proposals alike.

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Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual‐Level Analysis

Cited by 187 publications

References 37 publications

Democracy and Government Performance: Holding Incumbents Accountable in English Local Governments

Democracy and Government Performance: Holding Incumbents Accountable in English Local Governments

Voto econômico retrospectivo e sofisticação política na eleição presidencial de 2002

Intermediate Conditions of Democratic Accountability: A Response to Electoral Skepticism

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