Editorial: The neuroscience of theory of mind

Saxe, Rebecca; Baron‐Cohen, Simon

doi:10.1080/17470910601117463

Cited by 90 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…In general the results of our experiment replicate previous observations about the anatomical formation of the mentalizing or ToM network which frequently list dmPFC, STS, TPJ, TP as functional elements (Brune and Brune-Cohrs, 2006;Brunet-Gouet and Decety, 2006;Frith, 2006b, 2008;Saxe and Baron-Cohen, 2006). Activation of these regions was found as a differential effect of 3rd pp affective versus 1st pp visuospatial judgements and (Table 1) as a main effect of affective versus visuospatial content.…”

Section: Dissociable Effects Of Cognitive Empathy and Mentalizing Of supporting

confidence: 90%

Functional relations of empathy and mentalizing: An fMRI study on the neural basis of cognitive empathy

Schnell¹,

Bluschke²,

Konradt³

et al. 2011

NeuroImage

197

147

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Section: Dissociable Effects Of Cognitive Empathy and Mentalizing Of supporting

confidence: 90%

Functional relations of empathy and mentalizing: An fMRI study on the neural basis of cognitive empathy

Schnell¹,

Bluschke²,

Konradt³

et al. 2011

NeuroImage

197

147

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“…There is perhaps a stronger case for a more general role of mirror neurons in ToM. ToM is considered by some to be served by cognitive function that is specific to it (''domain-specific'' function), which requires separation from other ''domain-general'' functions, which may also include memory and executive function, but which may nevertheless be vital to ToM development [Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006;Saxe & Baron-Cohen, 2006;Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006]. Therefore, as will be discussed later, mirror neurons may be very important for ToM, but by serving a domain-general function.…”

Section: Tests Of the Neurobiological Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Self–other relations in social development and autism: multiple roles for mirror neurons and other brain bases

2008

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Mirror neuron system dysfunction may underlie a self-other matching impairment, which has previously been suggested to account for autism. Embodied Cognition Theory, which proposes that action provides a foundation for cognition has lent further credence to these ideas. The hypotheses of a self-other matching deficit and impaired mirror neuron function in autism have now been well supported by studies employing a range of methodologies. However, underlying mechanisms require further exploration to explain how mirror neurons may be involved in attentional and mentalizing processes. Impairments in self-other matching and mirror neuron function are not necessarily inextricably linked and it seems possible that different sub-populations of mirror neurons, located in several regions, contribute differentially to social cognitive functions. It is hypothesized that mirror neuron coding for action-direction may be required for developing attentional sensitivity to self-directed actions, and consequently for person-oriented, stimulus-driven attention. Mirror neuron networks may vary for different types of social learning such as ''automatic'' imitation and imitation learning. Imitation learning may be more reliant on self-other comparison processes (based on mirror neurons) that identify differences as well as similarities between actions. Differential connectivity with the amygdala-orbitofrontal system may also be important. This could have implications for developing ''theory of mind,'' with intentional self-other comparison being relevant to meta-representational abilities, and ''automatic'' imitation being more relevant to empathy. While it seems clear that autism is associated with impaired development of embodied aspects of cognition, the ways that mirror neurons contribute to these brain-behavior links are likely to be complex.

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“…The origin of this ability is often regarded as innately prepared (e.g., Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006;BaronCohen, 1995) due to selection pressures brought on by the computational demands associated with increasing social complexity (see Dunbar, 1998), and is considered an essential part of normal social functioning believed to distinguish humans from other species (see Saxe & Baron-Cohen, 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-cultural Reading the Mind in the Eyes: An fMRI Investigation

Adams

Rule

Franklin

et al. 2010

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

336

278

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The ability to infer others' thoughts, intentions, and feelings is regarded as uniquely human. Over the last few decades, this remarkable ability has captivated the attention of philosophers, primatologists, clinical and developmental psychologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists. Most would agree that the capacity to reason about others' mental states is innately prepared, essential for successful human social interaction. Whether this ability is culturally tuned, however, remains entirely uncharted on both the behavioral and neural levels. Here we provide the first behavioral and neural evidence for an intracultural advantage (better performance for same- vs. other-culture) in mental state decoding in a sample of native Japanese and white American participants. We examined the neural correlates of this intracultural advantage using fMRI, revealing greater bilateral posterior superior temporal sulci recruitment during same- versus other-culture mental state decoding in both cultural groups. These findings offer preliminary support for cultural consistency in the neurological architecture subserving high-level mental state reasoning, as well as its differential recruitment based on cultural group membership.

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Editorial: The neuroscience of theory of mind

Cited by 90 publications

References 41 publications

Functional relations of empathy and mentalizing: An fMRI study on the neural basis of cognitive empathy

Functional relations of empathy and mentalizing: An fMRI study on the neural basis of cognitive empathy

Self–other relations in social development and autism: multiple roles for mirror neurons and other brain bases

Cross-cultural Reading the Mind in the Eyes: An fMRI Investigation

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