Edmund Husserl: From Reason to Love

Melle, Ullrich

doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9924-5_12

Cited by 58 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…3 I will not discuss in this paper the changes that the concept of personal values brings about in Husserl's axiology and value theory (cf. Melle 1991;Hart 1992;Melle 2002;Hart 2006;Melle 2007;Peucker 2008;Hart 2009;Loidolt 2012;Drummond 2015a;Crespo 2015;Drummond 2018). These are fundamental and farreaching and need a separate, full-length paper to be analyzed.…”

Section: Egoic Depths Of Feeling and Decisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Values of love: two forms of infinity characteristic of human persons

Heinämaa

2020

Phenom Cogn Sci

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In his late reflections on values and forms of life from the 1920s and 1930s, Husserl develops the concept of personal value and argues that these values open two kinds of infinities in our lives. On the one hand personal values disclose infinite emotive depths in human individuals while on the other hand they connect human individuals in continuous and progressive chains of care. In order to get at the core of the concept, I will explicate Husserl's discussion of personal values of love by distinguishing between five related features. I demonstrate that values of love (1) are rooted in egoic depts and define who we are as persons, (2) differ from objective values in being absolute and non-comparative, (3) ground vocational lives as organizing principles, (4) are endlessly self-disclosing and self-intensifying, and (5) establish transitive relations of care between human beings. On the basis of my five-partite distinction, I argue that Husserl's concepts of love and value of love reveal the dynamic character of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

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Section: Egoic Depths Of Feeling and Decisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Values of love: two forms of infinity characteristic of human persons

Heinämaa

2020

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…However, he does not discuss the question of communication in this ‘community of love', as opposed to the crucial role language plays for scientific discourse. Unpublished as these musings may be (though publication is imminent; see also the reconstruction in Melle [31]), it is acknowledged that many of the lasting insights of Husserlian phenomenology stem from his research manuscripts.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Jaspers and Husserl: On the Capacities and Limits of Empathy and Communication in Psychiatric Praxis

Luft

Schlimme

2013

Psychopathology

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In this article, we present two accounts of intersubjectivity in Jaspers and Husserl, respectively. We argue that both can be brought together for a more satisfying account of empathy and communication in the context of psychiatric praxis. But while we restrict ourselves for the most part to this praxis, we also indicate the larger agenda that drives Jaspers and Husserl, despite all disagreement. Here we spell out, in particular, how a phenomenologically inspired account of empathy and intersubjectivity can have larger ramifications for a theory of social life and interaction. Finally, we argue for a ‘relaxed' view concerning the relation between pure and applied phenomenology, such that both can mutually benefit from one another.

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“…For a closer examination of the structure and main arguments of Husserl's early ethics cf Melle 1998, 2005a, 2005b, Drummond 2005, Crowell 2005 three corresponding forms of reason are: theoretical, axiological and practical reason. These three forms possess different features.…”

Section: Husserrs Phenomenological Conception Of a Scientific Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Husserl and the Fact of Practical Reason - Phenomenological Claims toward a Philosophical Ethics

Loidolt¹

2009

Coactivity

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The thesis of this paper is that Husserl, in his later ethics, reinterprets the philosophical content that discloses itself in the Kantian conception of a "fact of practical reason". From 1917/18 on, Husserl increasingly ceases to pursue his initial idea of a scientific ethics. The reason for this move lies precisely in the phenomenological analysis of "Gemütsakte", through which two main features ofthefact of practical reason impose themselves more and more on Husserls thought: the personal concernment/obligation and the primacy of the practical with the coeval call for universal validity. Husserl recognizes that the form of ethical facticity or entanglement cannot be grasped by a science of evidence, which speaks objectively and non-personally (apersonal) of acts of willing, valuing or preferring. Husserl thus gets to a reinterpretation ofthefact of practical reason as the philosophical nucleus of his ethics, which is now a personal and affective ethics. He bestows a texture on this fact, however not as he would have thought in the first place: not as evident laws of a material apriori of "Gemüt". In the person and her ethical experience as absolute affection Husserl rather discovers that which is per se not objectifiable and not to be made rationally evident. By this, Husserl captures and phenomenologically explains the non-objectifiable source of obligation and the possibility of complying with it.

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Edmund Husserl: From Reason to Love

Cited by 58 publications

References 10 publications

Values of love: two forms of infinity characteristic of human persons

Values of love: two forms of infinity characteristic of human persons

The Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in Jaspers and Husserl: On the Capacities and Limits of Empathy and Communication in Psychiatric Praxis

Husserl and the Fact of Practical Reason - Phenomenological Claims toward a Philosophical Ethics

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