2016
DOI: 10.4172/2375-4389.1000213
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Educational Institutions and Information Asymmetry Observation in UAE

Abstract: Nobel Prize winner Akerlof proposed lemon theory and showed how information asymmetry in the market creates an unbalanced information where poor quality offerings (lemons) wipe out good quality offerings in the market. Akerlof's model was originally developed in the context of used cars in the market where lemon problem was frequently observed. However, the theoretical problem lemon is not limited to the car market but also valid in other markets with the same situations. The present study focuses on informati… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The implication is that foundation principals need to clarify contracts with agents to obtain an equilibrium poll, such as the lemon problem model, to achieve organizational sustainability. The adverse selection problem stimulates contract ambiguity as a producer of agency conflict (McCaffrey, 2017;Suri & Adnan, 2016). As a result, only lemons works at IPHE and generates moral hazard when it comes to the foundation of IPHE.…”
Section: Outcome-based Contract To Prevent Moral Hazard and Adverse S...mentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The implication is that foundation principals need to clarify contracts with agents to obtain an equilibrium poll, such as the lemon problem model, to achieve organizational sustainability. The adverse selection problem stimulates contract ambiguity as a producer of agency conflict (McCaffrey, 2017;Suri & Adnan, 2016). As a result, only lemons works at IPHE and generates moral hazard when it comes to the foundation of IPHE.…”
Section: Outcome-based Contract To Prevent Moral Hazard and Adverse S...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on the previous study, adverse selection and moral hazard problems are produced by asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970;Jensen & Meckling, 1976;Ross, 1977). When asymmetric information between universities as principals convey good quality signals by VMMT with agent acceptance, it can produce adverse selection (Suri & Adnan, 2016). As a result, a contract is needed when the principal cannot differentiate the agent's actions in serving the principal interests (Posthumus & Solms, 2008;Wiseman, 1999).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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