Effect of Chinese pilots carbon emission trading scheme on enterprises' total factor productivity: The moderating role of government participation and carbon trading market efficiency

Pan, Xiongfeng; Pu, Chenxi; Yuan, Shuping; Hai-tao, XU

doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.115228

Cited by 120 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…On the one hand, CETP will directly “force” high-emission enterprises to reduce total carbon emissions via technological transformation and other means, thus reducing their relative disadvantage ( Yu et al, 2022 ). The increasing demand for technological innovation will lead to increased knowledge intensity and intensification, accelerated penetration of knowledge-based production factors, and increased labor productivity ( Pan et al, 2022 ). The adjustment of capital and production factors optimizes resource allocation through a low-carbon technology innovation system, thus promoting the rational allocation and utilization efficiency of resources and finally realizing carbon emission reduction.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The road to green development: How can carbon emission trading pilot policy contribute to carbon peak attainment and neutrality? Evidence from China

Lan

Zhu

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Carbon emission trading is not only a market-based instrument but also one of the government’s macro-policies, which is extremely crucial to fulfilling both carbon peak attainment and carbon neutrality goals. For this purpose, this paper adopts a 30-region dataset for the period from 2008 to 2020 in China and employs the difference-in-difference (DID) method to quantify the effect of the carbon emission trading pilot policy (CETP) on carbon emissions on the basis of introducing industrial structure upgrading and green technology innovation as moderating variables. The results show that (1) CETP has a statistically significant dampening effect on carbon emissions, while its carbon emission reduction effect follows a significant strengthening trend as the policy year of CETP implementation is delayed. (2) CETP has a significant carbon emission reduction effect. However, its effect demonstrates a gradual decrease from the eastern to the central and finally to the western regions. (3) CETP can inhibit carbon emissions depending on industrial structure upgrading to a certain extent, and this dependence is significant in the national and eastern regions but not in the central and western regions. (4) CETP’s carbon emission reduction effect is dependent on green technology innovation, which is only revealed in the western region and performs as a dampening effect in the national, eastern, and central regions, but not significantly.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The road to green development: How can carbon emission trading pilot policy contribute to carbon peak attainment and neutrality? Evidence from China

Lan

Zhu

2022

Front. Psychol.

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“…There are three types of participants in the carbon trading process, namely government environmental regulation departments, carbon emission enterprise 1, and carbon emission enterprise 2. The government, as the supervision department of carbon trading behavior [ 62 ] , chooses to implement a supervision or non-supervision strategy [ 63 ] . Enterprises, as the main body of carbon emission, choose whether to implement carbon emission reduction or not.…”

Section: Construction and Analysis Of Evolutionary Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

Chen

Liu

2022

IJERPH

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As one of the most efficient means of emission reduction policies, carbon quota trading has a far-reaching impact on the carbon emission reduction of enterprises. Firstly, a two-party evolutionary game model of enterprise and government and a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise–enterprise–government are constructed based on the multi-agent driving mechanism, evolutionary game theory, scenario simulation, and other methods. Then, we conduct a series of policy simulations for carbon emission under different scenario models and various enforcement strengths. Lastly, the behavioral strategies and system evolution trajectories in enterprises and government carbon trading are comprehensively investigated. The results show that in the two-party and three-party evolutionary game models, the carbon trading behavior is affected by the joint action of the enterprise and the government. The difference in initial willingness mainly affects the speed of the subject’s convergence to the steady state. Based on this, policy suggestions are proposed, such as reducing the cost of carbon emission of enterprises, enhancing the vitality of carbon emission reduction of enterprises, and stimulating the power of government regulation and responsibility performance, which can provide suggestions for the development of the carbon market.

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“…Authors such as [31] used a non-cooperative tripartite evolutionary game to simulate the dynamic strategic interactions among local governments, polluters, and the public to participate in governance, a new design of public participation mechanism is proposed to achieve cooperative evolutionary equilibrium. Among them, is cross-regional carbon emission governance, in which the central government plays an important regulatory role [32,33], and the government's reward and punishment decisions affect regional competition [34][35][36]. Few studies have been conducted to answer the question of how the inter-regional mitigation of transportation improves the level of emission management and how different strategies affect the level of transportation emission reduction.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Transportation Carbon Emission Reduction across Regions under Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

2022

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Pollution and carbon reduction is a key strategic direction for ecological civilization in China, and a hot issue of concern for the government and the whole society. The main goal of this paper was to consider the regional externalities of traffic emissions and clarify the relationship between provincial and central government strategies under the government reward and punishment mechanism. This paper considers the unevenness of regional transportation emissions, constructs a three-party evolutionary game model among transportation carbon deficit provinces, transportation carbon surplus provinces, and the central government, discusses the evolutionary stability of the game under different strategies of the three parties, and analyzes the influence of each element on the game structure. The study shows that: Environmental losses can increase the evolutionary speed of active emission reduction in transportation carbon deficit provinces, and the probability of supporting cross-regional carbon emission reduction in transportation carbon surplus provinces decreases slightly with the increase and the probability of central government regulation increases. The central government has a certain binding effect on transportation carbon deficit provinces and carbon surplus provinces through fines, and cross-zone cooperation subsidies are conducive to promoting carbon deficit provinces to actively reduce emissions. The cross-region compensation of carbon deficit provinces can promote the governments of carbon surplus provinces to support cross-region carbon emission abatement, and the cost of regulation will reduce the probability of central government regulation. Finally, Matlab simulation is used to verify the conclusions and provide countermeasures and suggestions for cross-regional abatement of regional transportation emissions by the central government.

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Effect of Chinese pilots carbon emission trading scheme on enterprises' total factor productivity: The moderating role of government participation and carbon trading market efficiency

Cited by 120 publications

References 57 publications

The road to green development: How can carbon emission trading pilot policy contribute to carbon peak attainment and neutrality? Evidence from China

The road to green development: How can carbon emission trading pilot policy contribute to carbon peak attainment and neutrality? Evidence from China

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Transportation Carbon Emission Reduction across Regions under Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

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