“…This means, on average, better governed corporations tend to engage significantly less in earnings smoothness than their poorly governed firms (Xie et al , 2001; Klein, 2002; Cornett et al , 2008; Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; García‐Meca and Sánchez‐Ballesta, 2009; Wang, 2014; Yasser and Mamun, 2015; Abbadi et al , 2016; Wan Mohammad et al , 2016; Dou et al , 2016; Du et al , 2017; Bajra and Cadez, 2017; Elghuweel et al , 2017; Al-Haddad and Whittington, 2019; Priscilla and Siregar, 2020). These firms have earnings that are more predictable, more persistent and higher levels of value relevance than their poorly governed counterparts (Calegari and Maretno, 2005; Habib and Azim, 2008; Cho and Rui, 2009; García Lara et al , 2010; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011; Ahmed and Ismail, 2013; Ogeh Fiador, 2013; Mollah et al , 2019; Almujamed and Alfraih, 2020; Asogwa et al , 2020; Omran and Tahat, 2020; Agustina et al , 2021). Also, better-governed firms have more timeliness earnings and engage in higher levels of earnings conservatism (Broedel Lopes and Walker, 2008; Xia and Zhu, 2009; García Lara et al , 2010; Lim, 2011; Leventis et al , 2013; Ebimobowei and Yadirichukwu, 2013; Lim et al , 2014; Huang et al , 2014; Mathuva et al , 2019; Syofyan et al , 2021; Sharma and Kaur, 2021).…”