Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debateable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the phenomenon, its theoretical consequences, and a variety of experimental results and possible interpretations of them. The paper concludes by proposing some constraints for analyses and definitions of cognitive penetrability.The dominant tradition in philosophy and psychology is to distinguish human perceptual experience from human cognition. Like many distinctions, this one is not readily made in an uncontroversial way. One method of distinction is to enumerate paradigmatic examples of each category. Such examples of perceiving include seeing, hearing, and touching. Examples of cognitive states or processes include believing, intending, and reasoning. Of course, we still want to know the criterion or criteria by which these mental types are put on one list rather than the other. There are at least two non-exclusive means by which this might be done: function and phenomenology.Consider vision. It functions to provide an agent with information about the colour, shape, and location features of the objects of her immediate environment. Thus we say that when one suffers a visual hallucination, vision has malfunctioned. Beliefs, by contrast, do not perform a function that is obligated to one's immediate environment. Although one can and does form beliefs about one's current surroundings, one also forms and maintains beliefs about the past and the future, and about locations removed from what is perceptually 1 Thank you to Vince Bergeron, Fiona Macpherson, and Wayne Wu for discussion of some of these issues.Special thanks to Susanna Siegel for reading and commenting on an earlier draft. And thanks finally to an anonymous referee for this journal.2 available. For instance, I can't presently see Vancouver, because I am in Toronto. But I presently have, and can reflect upon, many beliefs about Vancouver. Furthermore, one forms beliefs about things that are not perceptible at all, for example, about angels or Platonic Universals or the Gross Domestic Product of Sweden. This has a relevant physiological basis: belief states do not depend in any direct way upon current activity in one's sensory organs. One cannot see when one is completely blindfolded, but one can still have and consider one's beliefs. Add to this the observation that belief states, by contrast with visual experiences, figure directly into one's deliberative decision making. In making a decision on whether to, say, buy a new home, one considers the facts, as we say. And this is another way to say that one re...