Effect of the Internal Agency Problem on Risk-Sharing Incentive Contracts in Public–Private Partnership Projects

Shi, Lei; He, Yujia; Onishi, Masamitsu

doi:10.1061/jcemd4.coeng-13727

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 79 publications

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“…Firstly, from a qualitative perspective, the studies explore the incentive effects of shareholder composite identities and the agency perspective. Utilizing an analytical framework based on Nash bargaining game theory and the principal-agent model, it is believed that an appropriate equity structure can effectively motivate the private sector [14,15]. Private companies with a significant asset share in PPP projects are compelled to increase their level of effort [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Value Improvement Model of Private Parties as “Investor–Builder” Dual-Role Entity in Major River Green Public–Private Partnership Projects

Zhang,

Feng,

Zhang

et al. 2023

Buildings

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In Public–Private Partnership (PPP) projects, the structure of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) significantly impacts the value enhancement of projects. This study conducted a quantitative analysis of value enhancement in green PPP projects under single- and Dual-Role entity models and examined existing SPV private party compositions. A quantitative model was developed to enhance the value in green PPP projects through a Dual-Role “investor–builder” entity approach, comparing it with the single-role entity model. The findings indicate that in the Dual-Role entity mode, the construction party demonstrates a greater willingness to effort, resulting in shorter construction timelines and improved economic benefits for the project company. The preferred equity range for private parties escalates with the total project investment and the extent of “political support”. Nevertheless, a disproportionately high government stake in the equity is detrimental to the value enhancement in PPPs, and excessive government regulation and control should be avoided. This quantitative model serves as a decision-making criterion for selecting the SPV mode and provides an alternative approach for evaluating PPP project performance.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%