Effectiveness of Financial Incentives for Off-Peak Deliveries to Restaurants in Manhattan, New York

Holguín‐Veras, José; Pérez, Noel; Cruz, Brenda; Polimeni, John M.

doi:10.3141/1966-07

Cited by 20 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…As shown in Bjerkan et al (2012), the carriers are not convinced that GAZ would be effective, because they consider the potential to reduce emissions to be marginal. This is in line with Holguín-Veras et al (2006), who argue that financial incentives in the freight sector are not necessarily effective tools, as the competition for transport commissions hinders the price signal to reach the customers of transport services. In less competitive segments of the freight market pricing schemes could, however, be expected to be more effective.…”

Section: Implications For Managerial Practicesupporting

confidence: 52%

Can low emission zones be managed more dynamically and effectively?

Tretvik

Nordtømme

Bjerkan

et al. 2014

Research in Transportation Business & Management

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Section: Implications For Managerial Practicesupporting

confidence: 52%

Can low emission zones be managed more dynamically and effectively?

Tretvik

Nordtømme

Bjerkan

et al. 2014

Research in Transportation Business & Management

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“…Probably, the most comprehensive study of OHD focused on New York City (10,11). As part of this research a large outreach program was implemented involving focus groups, in-depth interviews, and Internet surveys (10,11). The outreach revealed that receivers would accept OHD only when given incentives to do so and that restaurants are a good target for OHD (10).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral Microsimulation Formulation for Analysis and Design of Off-Hour Delivery Policies in Urban Areas

Silas

Holguín‐Veras

2009

Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation R

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This paper is aimed at gaining a better understanding of how to increase participation in off-hour deliveries by using behavioral microsimulation (BMS) of carrier–receiver interactions. BMS is used to study the effectiveness of policies such as time-of-day pricing and financial incentives to receivers in exchange for their acceptance of off-hour deliveries. The main components of this BMS are the simulations of receiver and carrier behaviors. The simulation of receiver behavior uses a discrete choice model to estimate receivers’ decisions to accept or reject off-hour deliveries. The simulation of carriers’ behaviors uses receivers’ decisions as an input for deciding whether to make off-hour deliveries along with a computation of the associated delivery costs. The analyses done revealed several key results: ( a) tax deductions given to receivers in exchange for accepting off-hour deliveries and financial rewards to carriers making off-hour deliveries would increase participation in off-hour deliveries, ( b) time-of-day toll surcharges have no major impact on increasing off-hour deliveries, ( c) carriers located close to their urban customers are more likely to participate in off-hour deliveries because they can easily start to accrue the benefits from off-hour delivery operations, and ( d) increased enforcement of parking fines for double-parking during regular hours could increase the number of carriers participating in off-hour deliveries.

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“…First, and more importantly, the decision about time of travel is, to a great extent, determined by the receivers of the cargoes (they are the customers) who, as a rule, do not feel the impact of tolls. The data collected following the implementation of time-of-day pricing at the Hudson River facilities in New York City show that 68.9% of the truck-trips using the facilities did not change behavior because of "customer requirements" (Holguín-Veras et al 2006a, b). Furthermore, it was found that only 9% of the carriers passed the extra costs to their customers; and that, because they deliver to multiple customers,the cost increase was diluted (in average 15% of the shipping cost before the toll increase) (Holguín-Veras et al 2006a, b).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The data collected following the implementation of time-of-day pricing at the Hudson River facilities in New York City show that 68.9% of the truck-trips using the facilities did not change behavior because of "customer requirements" (Holguín-Veras et al 2006a, b). Furthermore, it was found that only 9% of the carriers passed the extra costs to their customers; and that, because they deliver to multiple customers,the cost increase was diluted (in average 15% of the shipping cost before the toll increase) (Holguín-Veras et al 2006a, b). This extra charge is of no consequence when compared with the marginal costs faced by receivers that decide to accept off-peak deliveries (OPD), that,according to the estimates produced by the authors with input from the private sector,easily reach $40-$50 per off-peak hour of operation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

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An Investigation on the Effectiveness of Joint Receiver–Carrier Policies to Increase Truck Traffic in the Off-peak Hours

et al. 2006

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This paper analyzes the effectiveness of comprehensive policies—aimed at fostering a switch of truck traffic from the peak to the off-peak hours—targeting receivers and carriers of goods in urban areas. This paper is also based on the fundamental premise that truck traffic in congested urban areas could move to the off-peak hours, if and only if, the receivers of the cargoes are willing to accept off-peak deliveries. The paper provides a conceptual description, based on game theory, of the fundamental interactions between receivers and carriers and discusses empirical data that confirms the basic findings from the game theoretical analyses. The policy analyses are based on stated preference data that was analyzed using discrete choice models. The data considers different policy scenarios targeting both receivers and carriers. The receiver centered policies considered include tax deductions and shipping cost discounts to companies willing to accept off-peak deliveries; while the carrier centered policies include: a request from receivers to do off-peak deliveries; a request from receivers to do off-peak deliveries combined with toll savings for trucks traveling during the off-peak hours; and a request from receivers to do off-peak deliveries combined with financial rewards for trucks traveling during the off-peak hours. This is the first paper in a series providing insight into possible public policies aimed at encouraging receivers to accept off-peak deliveries. This paper focuses on providing the overall description of the research process, and on describing the results corresponding to receiver centered scenarios that encourage off-peak deliveries. In addition to analyzing the overall effectiveness of comprehensive receiver-carrier policies, the paper discusses the special cases of large traffic generators and neighborhoods with high truck traffic as potential targets of specific off-peak delivery initiatives. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Road pricing, Congestion pricing, Time of day pricing, Freight pricing, Receiver and carrier behavior,

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Effectiveness of Financial Incentives for Off-Peak Deliveries to Restaurants in Manhattan, New York

Cited by 20 publications

References 2 publications

Can low emission zones be managed more dynamically and effectively?

Can low emission zones be managed more dynamically and effectively?

Behavioral Microsimulation Formulation for Analysis and Design of Off-Hour Delivery Policies in Urban Areas

An Investigation on the Effectiveness of Joint Receiver–Carrier Policies to Increase Truck Traffic in the Off-peak Hours

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