Effectiveness of One-Euro-Jobs: do programme characteristics matter?

Hohmeyer, Katrin

doi:10.1080/00036846.2011.591734

Cited by 17 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Our results differ to some extent from previous empirical evidence, but deliver new insights into the effectiveness of Temporary Extra Jobs. Unlike Hohmeyer and Wolff (2007) and Hohmeyer (2009) we do not find positive employment effects. This could be due to the use of a different outcome measure.…”

Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 99%

“…This could be due to the use of a different outcome measure. Hohmeyer and Wolff (2007) and Hohmeyer (2009) look at employment uptake irrespective of welfare status, whereas we focus on employment uptake conditional on departure from welfare receipt. The unconditional employment measure does not distinguish between employment that enables to live independently of welfare and employment that does not push workers out of the welfare system because wages are too low.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 4 Hohmeyer (2009) uses the same data as Hohmeyer and Wolff (2007) but extends the observation period to 28 months and distinguishes between different types of Temporary Extra Jobs according to overall program duration and working hours per week. She finds similar results but does not look at immigrants separately. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Temporary Extra Jobs for Immigrants: Merging Lane to Employment or Dead‐End Road in Welfare?

Thomsen

Walter

2010

Labour

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10027.pdf Non-technical summaryIn the context of a substantial welfare reform in 2005, a new employment program has been introduced in Germany, the so-called Temporary Extra Jobs. These jobs provide temporary work opportunities in the public sector for welfare recipients in order to maintain or enhance the employability of the participants and to improve the job chances for regular employment. While engaged, participants receive welfare benefits, and, in addition, for their efforts in the program, they are paid an hourly wage of between 1 and 2 Euro. Occupations in Temporary Extra Jobs have to be additional in nature, of value for society, and must not compete with regular jobs in the market. Despite being intended to act as a last resort of activation for the most disadvantaged welfare recipients, this function is hardly met. With more than 750,000 participants each year, the program is the most frequently used welfare-towork program in Germany.Within the population of welfare recipients in Germany, immigrants are clearly over-represented with a two thirds larger share than in the overall population. In 2006, more than 34 percent of all welfare recipients were immigrants while their corresponding share of the population was only about 19.5 percent. However, despite their over-representation in welfare, immigrants are not a specific priority group. For this reason, German welfare lacks integration plans for immigrants that are offered in other countries. Instead, immigrants are placed in the standard welfare-to-work programs that have been designed for all welfare recipients. Therefore, immigrants are also frequently placed in Temporary Extra Jobs, even though the use of the program in this group is somewhat less pronounced than in the group of native Germans.In this paper, we evaluate the effects of participating in a Temporary Extra Job on the chance of exiting welfare by taking up employment for immigrant welfare recipients. Since Germany's welfare-towork programs are not particularly designed for immigrants but for all welfare recipients, we contrast the findings to the effects for native Germans. In addition, we analyze potential differences in the effects between the two ethnic groups trying to illuminate the causes of these differences. For the empirical analysis we use an inflow sample into welfare in 2006 of about 160,000 observations with individual information obt...

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Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Temporary Extra Jobs for Immigrants: Merging Lane to Employment or Dead‐End Road in Welfare?

Thomsen

Walter

2010

Labour

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“…However, compared with waiting it would have been even better not to treat East German men at all or reduce participant numbers and change their composition, in order to limit participation to welfare recipients in need of this type of support. Furthermore, Hohmeyer (2012) did not find stronger lock-in effects for longer working hours. Also, after completing participation, the results suggest that there are hardly any differences in effectiveness between the regarded working hour groups, with one exception: For a 21 to 29 hour working week and East German women, the estimates imply positive employment effects compared with waiting and compared with working less or more.…”

Section: Provision Of One-euro-jobsmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…A first set of studies analysed administrative data and inflow cohorts into the programme just after introducing the Hartz IV reform. The sample in Hohmeyer (2012) and Hohmeyer and Wolff (2012) consists of the entire inflow of unemployed people into One-Euro-Jobs from February to April 2005 and a random sample of the stock of unemployed welfare recipients in January 2005 with no One-Euro-Jobs participation from February to April 2005. Their estimates imply that participation reduces the participants' regular employment rate by a few percentage points (lock-in effects) in the first months after programme start.…”

Section: Provision Of One-euro-jobsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subsidized work before and after the German Hartz reforms: design of major schemes, evaluation results and lessons learnt

Wolff

Stephan

2013

IZA J Labor Policy

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This review discusses empirical studies on hiring subsidies in the private sector and on schemes directly providing usually public or non-profit sector jobs for the unemployed in Germany. An important effect of hiring subsidies is that they stabilise employment. For employment schemes, results before the Hartz reforms imply mostly negative average treatment effects on regular employment outcomes of the treated, while results are mostly positive after introducing the reforms. During the years 2003 to 2005, the benefit system was radically reformed and now emphasizes mutual obligations. That might be one reason for changes in the effectiveness of job creation schemes.

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Give it Another Try: What are the Effects of a Job Creation Scheme Especially Designed for Hard-to-Place Workers?

Brändle

Fervers

2021

J Labor Res

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Previous evaluations of job creation schemes (JCS) reveal mostly negative employment effects, mainly due to inherent lock-in effects. In this paper, we assess the impact of an innovative JCS that employs a pre-selection mechanism to target programme participation on unemployed job seekers with very low integration chances, hereby reducing possible lock-in effects. Relying on high-quality administrative as well as survey data, we conduct regression-adjusted matching analyses to estimate the programme effect on integration into regular employment. Our results show that the programme did not succeed to foster labour market integration, but still entails remarkably negative employment effects in the first years after participation. We argue that this results from a principal-agent problem at the last step of the selection mechanism that may have led to cream-skimming rather than targeting on very hard to place workers. However, supplementary analyses reveal that negative effects can be avoided for subgroups with very poor employment chances in case of non-participation. These results are robust to the use of different matching estimators and definitions of non-participation. The inclusion of usually unobservable survey variables as well as placebo tests based on past employment outcomes refute concerns about endogenous selection. From a policy-perspective, these findings imply that targeting JCS on workers with very low integration chances is a key factor to avoid negative employment effects found in previous evaluations. At the methodological level, our analyses add to recent literature that assesses the credibility of non-experimental evaluations based on high-quality administrative data.

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Effectiveness of One-Euro-Jobs: do programme characteristics matter?

Cited by 17 publications

References 38 publications

Temporary Extra Jobs for Immigrants: Merging Lane to Employment or Dead‐End Road in Welfare?

Temporary Extra Jobs for Immigrants: Merging Lane to Employment or Dead‐End Road in Welfare?

Subsidized work before and after the German Hartz reforms: design of major schemes, evaluation results and lessons learnt

Give it Another Try: What are the Effects of a Job Creation Scheme Especially Designed for Hard-to-Place Workers?

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