Effectiveness research on the multi-player evolutionary game of coal-mine safety regulation in China based on system dynamics

Liu, Quanlong; Li, Xinchun; Meng, Xianglian

doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2018.07.014

Cited by 137 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…It can combine other theories for interdisciplinary researches. The research method combining SD and evolutionary game theory has been applied in engineering project management and other fields; for example, Liu et al combined multi-agent game with SD to discuss the long-term dynamic game process of stakeholders in coal mine safety production project under bounded rationality [22]. Xie et al proposed the behavior strategy model of central government, local government and farmers in cultivated land protection project based on evolutionary game, and simulated the system changes under different strategies through SD simulation [23].…”

Section: Methodsologymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Gao

2020

Sustainability

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The government, investors, and the public have formed a dynamic multi-game relationship on the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project, but few studies include them in a system to study their win–win solutions. Firstly, we constructed a tripartite game model of the government, investors, and the public based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, the evolutionary process of tripartite strategy behaviors was studied with the system dynamics (SD) model. Finally, the impact of changes in key factors on behavior strategies was studied through sensitivity analysis. The results show the following: (1) In the outsourcing of new energy and power construction PPP projects, the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state of {government supervision, public participation, investors effort}, the three parties achieve a win–win situation and the project benefits are the highest at this time, and the public participation will play an important role in promoting the smooth outsourcing of PPP projects. (2) The strategic choices of the government, investors, and the public are sensitive to changes in the corresponding exogenous variables. (3) The security factor plays a crucial role in the choice of public strategy. The public’s choice is not only affected by its own income and cost, but also by the amount of compensation promised by the government and the estimated damage caused by the investor.

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Section: Methodsologymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Gao

2020

Sustainability

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“…Furthermore, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the game model reach a stable state more quickly [28]. In summary, this study shows that the efficient cooperation among the organization (positive incentives), miners (safe operation), and managers (safety supervision) can make the coal-mine safety production system quickly enter the ideal state of stable and safe operation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 69%

“…However, the above research studies mainly focus on statically analyzing the game between two stakeholders and neglect the dynamic process of game play. In order to explain the dynamic process of coal-mine safety production more systematically and comprehensively, Liu et al [28] explored the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the long-term dynamic process of multiplayer game playing in coal-mine safety regulation under the condition of bounded rationality. Furthermore, the multiplayer evolutionary game was simulated by adopting system dynamics to analyze the implementation effect of different penalty strategies on the game process and game equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Zhang

Dai

et al. 2020

Complexity

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In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry.

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“…Therefore, EGT could solve the above limitation of traditional game theory, such as the information asymmetry issue, which is more in line with actual game scenarios [40]. EGT has been adopted by some studies to research the safety regulation of coal mines [41,42], food [43,44], aviation [45], internet [46,47], construction industry [48,49], environment [50][51][52] and supply chain [53]. In addition, some scholars have introduced EGT into the field of ridesharing research, such as the discussion on a dynamic game between platform companies and passengers [54,55].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Dynamic Evolution of Safety Regulation of the Ridesharing Industry under Social Media Participation

Sun

et al. 2020

Symmetry

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The emergence of ridesharing has spread against the background of the sharing economy. There have been a lot of controversies since the emergence of ridesharing, particularly regarding regulatory issues. The safety regulation of the ridesharing industry involves many parties, including governments, platform companies, and society at large. Currently, because of the influence of information asymmetry, it increases the uncertainty of governments’ regulation effect and the difficulty of making regulation measures. Meanwhile, social media, one of the most important forces of social regulation, has not paid enough attention to playing an appropriate role in the safety regulation of the ridesharing industry. Therefore, this study constructs an evolutionary game model between governments and platform companies that concerns the safety regulations of ridesharing passengers under social media participation. The influence path of social media is explored by model solution and numerical simulation. Our results indicate that social media participation has a positive impact on this safety regulation. Specifically, social media participation could reduce governments’ regulatory costs and encourage it to strictly regulate. The exposure of social media could bring losses to platform companies involved and promote platform companies’ investments in improving passengers’ safety. This study provides a decision basis for governments to introduce social media in the safety regulation of the ridesharing industry.

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Effectiveness research on the multi-player evolutionary game of coal-mine safety regulation in China based on system dynamics

Cited by 137 publications

References 29 publications

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Dynamic Evolution of Safety Regulation of the Ridesharing Industry under Social Media Participation

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