Effects of adaptive dynamical linking in networked games

Abstract

The role of dynamical topologies in the evolution of cooperation has received considerable attention, as some studies have demonstrated that dynamical networks are much better than static networks in terms of boosting cooperation. Here we study a dynamical model of evolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networks in which there are no permanent partners to each agent. Whenever a new link is created, its duration is randomly assigned without any bias or preference. We allow the agent to adaptively adjust the duration of each link during the evolution in accordance with the feedback from game interactions. By Monte Carlo simulations, we find that cooperation can be remarkably promoted by this adaptive dynamical linking mechanism both for the game of pairwise interactions, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG), and for the game of group interactions, illustrated by the public goods game (PGG). And the faster the adjusting rate, the more successful the evolution of cooperation. We also show that in this context weak selection favors cooperation much more than strong selection does. What is particularly meaningful is that the prosperity of cooperation in this study indicates that the rationality and selfishness of a single agent in adjusting social ties can lead to the progress of altruism of the whole population.

Evolution of cooperation in synergistically evolving dynamic interdependent networks: fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution

“…The adapting speed quantifies the ability to reorganize network structure dynamically in response to the dynamic state of nodes. Previous studies report that high-speed network-adapting is almost a necessary condition for coevolution dynamics to encourage cooperation [28,29,34,52,53]. In dynamic interdependent networks, however, we claim this issue can be, to some degree, addressed by seeking solutions from the perspective of coordination of different dynamical processes that simultaneously proceed in different layers.…”

“…How the cooperation level varies in dependence on Δ A , Δ B and u in the two-player prisoner's dilemma game (on Δ A , Δ B and g in the multi-player public goods game) in figure 3 stresses the familiar dominating effect of network-adapting speed on the evolution of cooperation in evolving dynamic networks [28,29,34,52,53]. Consider that there are usually critical parameter thresholds marking the emergence, extinction of cooperation and full-C phase in the aforementioned social dilemmas.…”

“…. β is the selection intensity and introduces a noise into strategy-learning [34]. Cross-layer strategy-learning is forbidden in this work.…”

“…Myriad mechanisms such as kin selection [5,6], punishment [7][8][9][10] and voluntary participation [11] are proposed to rescue such cooperation tragedy in this spectrum (see review [12,13]). In particular, by taking into account the following aspects, the recent shift from evolutionary games in well-mixed populations [14][15][16] and static networks [17][18][19][20][21][22][23] to evolutionary games in multiplex networks [24][25][26][27] and dynamic networks [28][29][30][31][32][33][34] has stimulated mounting efforts in exploring cooperation dynamics in more realistic scenarios (see review [35][36][37][38]).…”

Evolution of cooperation driven by majority-pressure based interdependence

“…As a discipline closely related to evolutionary game theory, network science has amazingly penetrated into various realms due to growing dependence of modern society on the intricate web of critical infrastructure systems whose backbones are perfectly mapped by complex networks [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20]. Equally striking is the fact that spatial games concerning structured populations also have attracted considerable attention in the past few decades [21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40]. And network reciprocity, inspired by the seminal work of Nowak et al [41], has long since been regarded as a most well-known mechanism to encourage the evolution of cooperation, which probably signifies network structure indeed has a talent for boosting cooperation by means of insulating cooperators from exploitation by noncooperators.…”