What can counseling researchers do? On one hand their research is criticized by practitioners who claim it is sterile and offers little that is helpful in counseling practice (Goldman, 1978;Sprinthall, 1975). On the other hand, counseling research receives the condemnation of those who are thought to represent and monitor the scientific research tradition. They view counseling research as shabby and lacking the precision and rigor essential to scientific inquiry (Ripstra, 1974;Thoresen, 1969). Of real concern is how counseling research can be conducted within the constructs of scientific inquiry while at the same time be of service to practitioners. This dilemma is particularly acute for counseling researchers and practitioners who identify with the humanistic counseling tradition. We contend that humanistic counseling, by the nature of its epistemology and its definition of the helping process, has contributed to the development of an atheoretical, if not antitheoretical, view of research that does not support the accumulation of knowledge for action. How do the concerns of the humanistic counselor for the counseling process and individual subjective experiences get translated into empirically based guidelines for counseling practice? The natural and biological sciences have models that guide theoretical inquiry. This paper will identify attitudes in the emergence of humanistic counseling that have restricted the development of a model of rationality to guide counseling inquiry and action; present a model (Strike, 1979) that shows promise for providing a theoretical base for humanistic counseling research; and illustrate the use of this model with a humanistic counseling concern. TOWARD HUMANISTIC COUNSELING Humanistic or "Third Force" counseling approaches (client-centered, existential, gestalt, and others) are not tied together by similar counseling techniques, nor do they represent a unified school of psychologlcal thought. Rather, humanistic approaches are held together by common beliefs about the nature of man and the nature of the helping process. The movement started as a rebellion against the deterministic cause and effect orientation of classical Freudian psychoanalysis and behavioral psychologies. Rollo May (1967) symbolizes the spirit and cutting edge of this rebellion in the following statement:Freud is seduced by the handy, tangible systemization of natural science; and he uses it as a procrustean bed on which he lays the human personality and forces it to fit. This is the fallacy, all too common in recent decades, which arises out of the failure to recognize the limits of the scientific method. Though the objectivity of science aids us greatly in coming to a useful understanding of certain phases of human mental phenomena, to imagine that the whole of the creative, often times unpredictable, certainly intangible aspects of the human mind can be reduced to a cause and effect mechanistic principle is sheer folly. (pp. 48-49) Humanists replaced the objective, scientific method of the determinists (...