Participants read either a metaphorical prime sentence, such as That defense lawyer is a shark, or they read a baseline-prime sentence. The baseline-prime sentence was literally meaningful in Experiment 1 (e.g., That large hammerhead is a shark), nonsensical in Experiment 2 (e.g., His English notebook is a shark), and unrelated in Experiment 3 (e.g., That new student is a clown). After reading the prime sentence, participants verified a target property statement. Verification latencies for property statements relevant to the superordinate category (e.g., Sharks are tenacious) were faster after participants read the metaphor-prime sentence than after they read the baseline-prime sentence, producing an enhancement effect. In contrast, verification latencies for property statements relevant to only the basic-level meaning of the vehicle and not the superordinate (e.g., Sharks are good swimmers), were slower following the metaphor-versus the baseline-prime sentence, producing a suppression effect. As Glucksberg and Keysar's (1990) class inclusion theory of metaphor predicts, the enhancement effect demonstrates that the vehicle of a metaphor stands for the superordinate category of the vehicle, and the suppression effect demonstrates that the metaphorical vehicle does not stand for its basic-level meaning.Language users experience little difficulty understanding a sentence such as Perjury is a boomerang, especially if they followed trials involving a perjured president. In contrast, theories of language have particular difficulty when it comes to explaining how language users understand metaphorical sentences. This difficulty stems from the traditional literal bias of theories of language.A literal interpretation of perjury is a boomerang would yield an anomaly, either on semantic or pragmatic grounds; perjury is not a boomerang, and attempting to categorize perjury into boomerang as one categorizes robins as birds results in a semantic anomaly or