Effects of inconsistent eyewitness statements on mock-jurors' evaluations of the eyewitness, perceptions of defendant culpability and verdicts.

Abstract

In attempting to discredit an eyewitness, it is a common strategy for an attorney to highlight inconsistencies in the eyewitness's recall testimony during cross-examination and encourage the jurors to infer, based on those inconsistencies, that the eyewitness's memory is faulty. An experiment was conducted to examine the effectiveness of this cross-examination strategy. Subjects viewed a simulated cross-examination and rendered judgments about the eyewitness and defendant. The type of inconsistent testimony was manipulated between subjects. Subjects exposed to inconsistent recall testimony about either central or peripheral details perceived the eyewitness as less credible (as evidenced by ratings on multiple dimensions) and the defendant as less culpable. Inconsistency on central details led to fewer convictions. Results point to the effectiveness of this cross-examination strategy.* The authors are indebted to Laura Bonich, Theresa Younes, and Catherine Captain for their assistance in preparation of materials and data collection. We also thank Michael Leippe and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. Requests for reprints should be sent to

Retrieval-enhanced suggestibility: A retrospective and a new investigation.

“…Because eyewitnesses are often required to complete multiple interviews prior to their in-court appearance, concerns regarding the credibility of the witness accounts can arise when the witness changes his/her memory reports across interviews (e.g., when the witness recalls that the perpetrator was wearing a red shirt during one interview and then recalls that the perpetrator was wearing a gray shirt during a subsequent interview). Mock jurors judge inconsistent witnesses as less credible than consistent witnesses (Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995;Brewer & Burke, 2002;Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2009). …”

Coherence and Reliability in Judicial Reasoning

“…Similarly, Lagnado and Harvey (2008) argue that when performing complex reasoning tasks where not all evidence point in the same direction, people group the evidence into different coherent sets as a basis for further consideration. In related studies it has been concluded that, if an individual witness delivers inconsistent testimonies, then subjects will assign her a lower degree of credibility; and it has been observed that inconsistency leads to lower rates of conviction (see, e.g., Berman and Cutler 1996;Berman, Narby and Cutler 1995). Finally, Brewer et al (1999) present evidence supporting the claim that perceived witness credibility is positively affected by consistency between reports from different witnesses, albeit to a lesser extent than intra-witness consistency.…”

Twelve Certain Men: The Impact of Emotional Appraisals on Juror Decision-Making

“…Since all inconsistencies are from plaintiff's witnesses, and since jurors tend to view inconsistency as a proxy for inaccuracy (although most research on the testimonial inconsistency/inaccuracy relationship has revolved around eyewitness identifications [Berman & Cutler, 1996;Berman, et al, 1995;Brewer & Burke, 2002;Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2002]), the plaintiff's case against the defendant should be viewed as being weaker by those participants in uncertain emotional states. Because they will have an affirmative, demonstrable basis for verdicts in favor of the defendant, it is predicted that participants in uncertain emotional states who read the inconsistent transcripts will have the highest degree of confidence in their verdict.…”

“…Prior research on the effects of inconsistent testimony by eyewitnesses has found that exposing mock jurors to different levels of inconsistency (new testimony offered during the trial which was not disclosed during any investigation, contradictions between pretrial assertions and in-court testimony, and inconsistent statements within trial testimony), no matter how diagnostic the content, any exposure to inconsistent eyewitness testimony reduced likelihood of conviction, degree of defendant guilt, and eyewitness credibility (Berman & Cutler, 1996). Similarly, Berman, Narby, and Cutler (1995) found that with regard to eyewitness testimony, any inconsistent statements by the witness having to do with their view of the perpetrator, whether perceptually central (i.e., having to do with the perpetrator's appearance) or perceptually peripheral (i.e., having to do with information irrelevant to the accuracy of a personal identification, such as nearby objects) in nature, resulted in lower ratings of defendant culpability and lower ratings of eyewitness credibility by mock juror participants, while those participants who were exposed to eyewitnesses making inconsistent statements regarding perceptually central details convicted the defendant at a lower rate. However, these distinct effects of inconsistencies focused on central and/or peripheral details of perception and not central and/or peripheral details in terms of relevance to legal decision-making or any probative value, so it is possible that the overall legal relevance of the inconsistencies themselves may explain why I did not find what I had expected to find.…”

“…Jurors can be exposed to a virtually limitless array of potential evidence, bounded only by the scope of what can be at issue in a legal matter. However, research has shown that one of the most powerfully persuasive decision-making cues which jurors are faced with in their role as triers of fact is that of inconsistent testimony (Berman & Cutler, 1996;Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995;Brewer & Hupfeld, 2004;, though the consistency/accuracy, accuracy/credibility, and consistency/verdict relationships are themselves somewhat varied and inconsistent (Brewer & Burke, 2002;Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, & Luszcz, 1999). For example, mock jurors found that inconsistent statements made by a 6-year old rendered that witness as seeming less credible than when the same inconsistent statements were proffered by a 10-or 30-year old witness (Leippe & Romanczyk, 1989).…”