Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Abstract

Industrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on cluster enterprises and the behavior of external partners. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the innovative cooperation among local and external cluster enterprises. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of enterprises in different situation. Furthermore, by using MATLAB software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the accuracy and reliability of the game model. Results show that, in addition to the formal market contract, effective implementations of cluster informal contracts can reduce opportunistic behavior in innovative cooperation among internal and external enterprises. Meanwhile, we should pay attention to strengthen the external innovative cooperation, increase severity of penalties, enhance the credit network externality, and avoid the relevant risks. The paper enriches our understanding about how informal contracts can help promote and cultivate good cooperative order in innovative cooperation of clusters.

Open innovation in the semiconductor industry: analysis of Brazilian design houses

“…Although the predominance of formal agreements to mediate the collaboration with partners, the informal agreements can also bring significant contributions to the process of innovation of DHs, as they are more dynamic and do not need contracts. Especially in high-tech industries, such as the semiconductor industry, requiring the creation of innovations continuously (Bönte & Keilbach, 2005; Han et al , 2018; Hannigan et al , 2018).…”

“…These mechanisms of collaboration can be established through formal agreements, when the exchanges of knowledge between organizations are established by contracts and formal documents (Cruz-Cázares et al , 2018; Simard & West, 2011); and informal agreements. The last one may result from informal communication between employees or organizations research teams without direct formal ties or formal collaboration (Bönte & Keilbach, 2005; Han et al , 2018; Hannigan et al , 2018). Different forms of collaboration are provided in Table I.…”

“…Second, the DHs can consider the use of informal agreements to mediate the collaboration with its partners. They can also bring significant contributions to the process of innovation of DHs, as they are more dynamic and do not need contracts (Bönte & Keilbach, 2005; Han et al , 2018; Hannigan et al , 2018).…”

Logistics Outsourcing of Fresh Enterprises Considering Fresh-Keeping Efforts Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis

“…Cui et al [19] establish evolutionary game models between the government and farmers, farmers and agricultural enterprises, to obtain the best stable strategy to achieve better green development. Han et al [20] discuss the influence of informal cluster contracts on the behavior of cluster enterprises and external partners based on dynamic evolutionary game theory. Gu et al [21] construct an evolutionary game model to study the cooperation of natural resources and energy-intensive industries in reverse logistics operations.…”

A double moral hazard model for inter‐organizational knowledge sharing

“…To do that, we develop a Stackelberg game model between the sender and the receiver, and analyse whether the knowledge misappropriation rate increases or decreases with the knowledge concealment rate, and discusses the strategies that can control both of the knowledge concealment and misappropriation. On the other hand, the existing papers on moral hazard control either only focus on the punishment strategies or focus on the monitoring effort (Han et al, 2018;Khalil et al, 2015;Lin & Hu, 2009;Ryu et al, 2018). However, in reality, the efficiency of moral hazard control strategies is affected by both of the punishment strategies and the monitoring effort.…”