Effects of mediation and alternative forms of arbitration on bargaining behavior: A laboratory study.

Grigsby, David W.; Bigoness, William J.

doi:10.1037/0021-9010.67.5.549

Cited by 20 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The findings from the current research highlight a useful strategy that mediators might adopt for promoting better outcomes from negotiation (e.g., see Carnevale, 1992; Esser & Marriott, 1995; Greig, 2001; Grigsby & Bigoness, 1982; Pruitt & Johnson, 1970; Wall, 1984; for reviews see Kolb, 1983; Wall, 1981; Wall, Stark, & Standifer, 2001). In addition to sequencing the order in which issues are dealt with during negotiation, mediators are frequently responsible for the packaging of issues and the shaping of proposals during negotiation (Lim & Carnevale, 1990).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 75%

The Effects of Abstraction on Integrative Agreements: When Seeing the Forest Helps Avoid Getting Tangled in the Trees

Henderson

Trope

2009

Social Cognition

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The present research suggests that negotiators who represented negotiation issues more abstractly were more likely to reach integrative agreements. Specifically, participants who were prompted to directly think about their negotiation issues in a more abstract manner by generating general descriptions of the issues rather than more concretely about the negotiation issues by generating specific descriptions of the issues made more multi-issue offers and achieved higher joint gain from the negotiation. The role of abstraction in negotiation and conflict resolution is discussed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 75%

The Effects of Abstraction on Integrative Agreements: When Seeing the Forest Helps Avoid Getting Tangled in the Trees

Henderson

Trope

2009

Social Cognition

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“…It lowers the parties' aspirations and brings them closer to agreement in the negotiation (Notz & Starke, 1978). Likewise, it resolves more issues and tends to bring greater final concessions (Grigsby & Bigoness, 1982).…”

Section: Arbitrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict and Its Management

Wall

Callister

1995

Journal of Management

616

412

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This article reviews the conflict literature, first examining the causes of conflict, its core process, and its effects. Subsequently, we probe into conflict escalation (and de-escalation), contexts, and conflict management. When examining this last topic, we note that conflict can be managed by the disputants themselves, by managers, or by other thirdparties. In conclusion we suggest directionsforfuture research and provide recommendations for practicing managers.There ain't no good guys There ain't no bad guys, There's only you and me, And we just disagree.-Dave MasonWhen we're in a conflict, we don't see it that way. There are good guys; there are bad guys; we don't "just disagree." Conflict-to most of us-is mighty unpleasant.It's like the common cold. We all know what it is, but objectively analyzing it can prove difficult, as can identifying the causes and understanding the effects. And most difficult is discovering a cure.In this article we'll undertake these tasks-for conflict. First offered will be a general overview of the conflict process, immediately followed with a definition or explanation of the construct. In subsequent sections we will delineate the causes of conflict, examine the core process, and identify its effects. Then we will look at conflict escalation and the context in which conflict takes place.With these ideas under our belts, we'll turn to the management of conflict, closing with some suggestions for researchers and managers.

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“…Some researchers have used role-playing or mock negotiation experiments to study commonly used arbitration rules (for example, Neale and Bazeman 1983;Grigsby and Bigoness 1982;Notz and Starke 1978). However, leaving the arbitrator decision-making process uncontrolled can result in confounding effects that make data interpretation difficult.…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comparison of Conventional, Final-Offer, and “Combined” Arbitration for Dispute Resolution

Dickinson

2004

ILR Review

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Two widely used forms of arbitration are conventional arbitration, in which the arbitrator makes an unconstrained settlement choice, and final-offer arbitration, in which the arbitrator must choose between disputants' final offers. Under an innovative, as yet unused approach called "combined arbitration," if the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement lies between the disputants' final offers, final-offer arbitration rules are used; otherwise, conventional arbitration rules are used. Theoretically, by combining the risks that the two standard forms of arbitration pose for disputants who do not voluntarily settle, combined arbitration should generate convergent final offers. The results of this controlled laboratory study show, however, that dispute rates are highest in combined arbitration and lowest in conventional arbitration. These results challenge the theoretical predictions for combined arbitration as well as claims that final offer arbitration should reduce disputes compared to conventional arbitration. The results are, however, consistent with a simple theory of disputant optimism.This article reports the results from a laboratory test of disputant behavior under three different forms of arbitration: conventional arbitration (CA), final-offer arbitration (FOA), and an innovative procedure -as yet untried in real-world cases -called "Combined Arbitration" (CombA) that combines elements of CA and FOA. In CA, the arbitrator is free to impose any settlement, whereas the rules of FOA stipulate that the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the disputants' final offers. FOA was originally designed to increase the uncertainty costs of arbitration and to induce more settlements, but much of the theoretical work on FOA has cast doubt on that expectation. [1] Brams and Merrill (1986) devised the CombA procedure by combining the rules of CA and FOA in a way that generates theoretically convergent final offers.[2] The rules of CombA are simple. If the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement lies between the disputants' final offers, then the rules of FOA are used. Otherwise, the rules of CA are used. If the CombA rules generate convergent final offers in practice, and not just in theory, then CombA offers a potential major advantage over commonly used arbitration procedures: increased voluntary settlement rates. Disputants presumably prefer voluntary settlements over arbitrated settlements, and they would also save substantial time and money by invoking arbitration less frequently.My primary goal in this article is to examine CombA's relative effectiveness. A secondary goal is to provide additional data comparing CA and FOA. Existing research contains mixed or inconclusive reports on the effectiveness of CA versus FOA, and this debate is far from resolved.[3] As will be discussed, the comparison of CA and FOA in this paper improves on previous laboratory comparisons in several ways. MOTIVATION

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Effects of mediation and alternative forms of arbitration on bargaining behavior: A laboratory study.

Cited by 20 publications

References 18 publications

The Effects of Abstraction on Integrative Agreements: When Seeing the Forest Helps Avoid Getting Tangled in the Trees

The Effects of Abstraction on Integrative Agreements: When Seeing the Forest Helps Avoid Getting Tangled in the Trees

Conflict and Its Management

A Comparison of Conventional, Final-Offer, and “Combined” Arbitration for Dispute Resolution

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