Effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout

Abstract

We study the effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout in a difference-indifferences framework, using data from a wave of municipal mergers in Finland in 2009. Analysing two pre-merger elections and three post-merger elections, spanning a total of 17 years, we find that municipal mergers decrease voter turnout by 4 percentage points in the long run in the relatively small municipalities compared to similar small municipalities that did not merge. As the average turnout rate prior to merging in this group was around 69%, this is a substantial effect. We also find that virtually nothing happens to turnout in the municipalities that were relatively large within their merger. Furthermore, mergers are associated with a decrease in voters' political efficacy and turnout decreases more in those municipalities that experience larger decreases in efficacy.

Merging county administrations – cross-national evidence of fiscal and political effects

“…Table 5 shows for the case of Saxony-Anhalt that voter turnout in county council election decrease by 4.3 percentage points in merged counties compared to unmerged counties. This is fully in line with findings by Fritz and Feld (2015), Koch and Rochat (2017), and (Lapointe, Saarimaa, and Tukiainen 2018) for municipal mergers in Germany, Switzerland, and Finland respectively. Vote shares for right-wing populists, by contrast, increase by around 1.8 percentage points, which is substantial given the mean right-wing populist vote share of 2.0%.…”

“…Almost all quasi-experimental studies which offer a causal interpretation do not show that mergers reduce total expenditures (Lüchinger and Stutzer 2002;Moisio and Uusitalo 2013;Allers und Geertsma 2016;Blesse and Baskaran 2016;Blom-Hansen et al 2016;Fritz 2016;Studerus 2016;Harjunen, Saarimaa, and Tukiainen 2017;Sandsør, Falch, and Strøm 2017); Reingewertz (2012) being the sole exception. 4 Voter turnout in local elections, by contrast, seems to decrease (Fritz and Feld 2015;Koch and Rochat 2017;Lapointe, Saarimaa, and Tukiainen 2018). Studies also focus on city-county mergers which are a very specific form of county mergers (Blume and Blume 2007;Tang and Hewings 2017).…”

Merging County Administrations – Cross-National Evidence of Fiscal and Political Effects

“…Table 5 shows for the case of Saxony-Anhalt that voter turnout in county council election decrease by 4.3 percentage points in merged counties compared to unmerged counties. This is fully in line with findings by Fritz and Feld (2015), Koch and Rochat (2017), and Lapointe et al 2018 for municipal mergers in Germany, Switzerland, and Finland respectively. Vote shares for right-wing populists, by contrast, increase by around 1.8 percentage points, which is substantial given the mean right-wing populist vote share of 2.0 percent.…”

“…Koch and Rochat (2017) report similar effects on voter turnout for Swiss municipalities where also local referenda on municipal mergers were held. Lapointe et al 2018 elaborate on the Finish case. We conclude that based on our empirical findings also mergers on the county level may have adverse effects on local democracy.…”

“…Almost all quasi-experimental studies which offer a causal interpretation do not show that mergers reduce total expenditures (Lüchinger und Stutzer 2002, Moisio und Uusitaalo 2013, Allers und Geertsma 2016, Blesse und Baskaran 2016, Blom-Hansen et al 2016, Fritz 2016, Studerus 2016, Harjunen et al 2017, Sandsør et al 2017); Reingewertz (2012) being the sole exception. 4 Voter turnout in local elections, by contrast, seems to decrease (Fritz and Feld 2015, Koch und Rochat 2017, Lapointe et al 2018. Studies also focus on city-county mergers which are a very specific form of county mergers (Blume andBlume 2007, Tang andHewings 2017).…”