Effects of prior interpretation on situation assessment in crime analysis

Abstract

A main threat to objective information processing in crime investigation teams is the tendency to focus on one particular interpretation only. To prevent such tunnel vision or 'groupthink', an investigation team can call in a crime analyst, and ask him or her to give a fresh and independent account of the evidence at hand. However, before they examine the case, crime analysts are often already aware of the scenario currently favoured by the team. In our experiment, we investigated whether such prior knowledge can jeopardise the independence of the analyst's advice. Thirty-eight professional crime analysts were asked to generate causal scenarios for two different cases and to indicate how the team should continue their investigation. Before beginning their analysis, half of the crime analysts received a realistic prior interpretation, such as might have been constructed by an investigation team. The results show that when given a prior interpretation, both experienced and inexperienced analysts considered the scenario suggested therein as more likely, and made recommendations for further investigation accordingly. We explain these findings by suggesting that analysts temporarily adopted the perspective of the investigation team, and that such temporary commitment by itself increased confidence in the hypothesis at hand (Koehler, 1991). This research supports previous research on the impact of prior theory on judgement, and extends it to an important real world domain where mistakes can have serious consequences. We recommend that in cases where the crime analyst is asked to give an objective assessment, he or she should not be informed about the interpretation of the investigation team until after the analysis has been conducted.

Let's find the evidence: an analogue study of confirmation bias in criminal investigations

“…Meanwhile, the fi ndings cast some doubt on the assumption that the confi rmation bias lurks in legal decision making (see Kerstholt & Eikelboom, 2007;Schünemann & Bandilla, 1989). That is, leaving one exception, it can be concluded that participants did not favour incriminating evidence over exonerating evidence.…”

Cognitive Biases in Criminal Case Evaluation: A Review of the Research

“…Eight studies with law enforcement personnel (Ask & Granhag 2007b;Ask et al 2008;Charman et al 2017;Ditrich 2015;Groenendaal & Helsloot 2015;Marksteiner et al 2010;Rassin 2010;Wallace 2015) examined aspects of confirmation bias; one addressed the distinct but related phenomenon of groupthink (Kerstholt & Eikelboom 2007). The importance of this issue was demonstrated by a survey of an unspecified number of professional crime scene officers conducted by Ditrich (2015), asking for their opinions about the relative frequency and severity of various cognitive errors that could potentially negatively affect a criminal investigation; based on their experiences, respondents highlighted confirmation bias (as well as overestimating the validity of partial information and shifting the burden of proof to the suspect).…”

Reducing tunnel vision with a pen‐and‐paper tool for the weighting of criminal evidence

“…What alternative scenario can then be employed to remain open minded? Kerstholt and Eikelboom (2007) found that even professional crime analysists sometimes experience difficulties in producing alternative scenarios. But even if an alternative scenario is present, it is unclear how the alternative should be used (Mynatt, Doherty, & Dragan, 1993).…”