2018
DOI: 10.1103/physreve.98.052301
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Effects of sampling interaction partners and competitors in evolutionary games

Abstract: The sampling of interaction partners depends on often implicit modelling assumptions, yet has marked effects on the dynamics in evolutionary games. One particularly important aspect is whether or not competitors also interact. Population structures naturally affect sampling such that in a microscopic interpretation of the replicator dynamics in well-mixed populations competing individuals do not interact but do interact in structured populations. In social dilemmas interactions with competitors invariably inhi… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…For example, in the snow-drift game, spatial structure can increase the equilibrium frequency of cooperation from that of an unstructured population, and indeed the right choice of payoffs can eliminate defectors altogether [18]. The sharp contrast between Bd and dB updating seen in the prisoner’s dilemma does not hold for the snowdrift game, which may be attributed (in part) to the fact that defection is not a dominant action in this game [22]. In more stringent conflicts of interest like the production of social goods, where defection is dominant, non-weak selection can draw richer behavior out of social dilemmas, even resulting in the proliferation of altruistic traits when there is global competition to reproduce.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For example, in the snow-drift game, spatial structure can increase the equilibrium frequency of cooperation from that of an unstructured population, and indeed the right choice of payoffs can eliminate defectors altogether [18]. The sharp contrast between Bd and dB updating seen in the prisoner’s dilemma does not hold for the snowdrift game, which may be attributed (in part) to the fact that defection is not a dominant action in this game [22]. In more stringent conflicts of interest like the production of social goods, where defection is dominant, non-weak selection can draw richer behavior out of social dilemmas, even resulting in the proliferation of altruistic traits when there is global competition to reproduce.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The general question of whether prosocial behaviors like cooperation can be favored on any topology, under Bd updating and weak selection, is unresolved, but it is generally believed that this is not possible [9, 21, 22]. The intuition behind this is that in Bd updating, adjacent individuals, who are playing the prisoner’s dilemma against each other, also compete to reproduce, since Bd updating first selects a node to reproduce proportional to fecundity.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The general question of whether prosocial behaviors like cooperation can be favored on any topology, under Bd updating and weak selection, is unresolved, but it is generally believed that this is not possible [ 4 , 10 , 11 ]. The intuition behind this is that in Bd updating, adjacent individuals, who are playing the prisoner’s dilemma against each other, also compete to reproduce, since Bd updating first selects a node to reproduce proportional to fecundity.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is therefore one of the key mechanisms enabling cooperation [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]. On the other hand, spatial structure may also inhibit cooperation when compared to the replicator dynamics [14]; comparison with random-matching models shows that spatial structure is still beneficial [15].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%