Effects of self-presentation on the phenomenal self.

Abstract

We examined the effects of strategic self-enhancement or self-deprecation on private self-appraisal. Previous work (Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981) indicated that self-perception variables (whether subjects self-referenced) best account for elevations in self-esteem after self-enhancing behavior, whereas cognitive dissonance variables (whether subjects were given a clear choice to engage in the behavior) best account for decreases in self-esteem after self-deprecating behavior. We proposed that these findings can be accommodated by a model that represents the phenomenal self as a latitude of acceptance that incorporates both positive and negative self-referent material, and as latitudes of rejection containing potential positive and negative material not currently stored in self-referent form. An individual-difference approach (level of depression) was taken in order to test the prediction that self-perception would account for positive and negative shifts in self-esteem within subjects' latitudes of acceptance, and cognitive dissonance would explain positive and negative shifts in self-esteem within subjects' latitudes of rejection. Accordingly, depressed and nondepressed subjects were instructed to self-reference or to role-play self-enhancement or self-deprecation during an interview while under high-or low-choice instructions. In support of the model, the results indicated that self-perception processes mediated subsequent shifts in self-esteem for self-enhancing nondepressed and self-deprecating depressed subjects. Cognitive dissonance processes mediated subsequent shifts in self-esteem for selfdeprecating nondepressed and self-enhancing depressed subjects.Our concern in this article is the effect of self-presentational behavior on the phenomenal self (Jones & Gerard, 1967). In Jones and Gerard's usage, the phenomenal self refers to "a person's awareness, arising out of his [or her] interactions with the environment, of his [or her] own beliefs, values, attitudes, the links between them, and their implications for his behavior" (Jones & Gerard, 1967, p. 716). In their view, people have available an integrated representation of who they are that may be used for the interpretation of present behavior and serves as a guide for future acts. When in awareness, the phenomenal self represents a summary statement of the self-relevant information currently accessible. 1 Stability is facilitated through one's interactions with others who see one in terms of stable traits or attributes. However, because one's available self-knowledge is too vast to fit into awareness at any one moment, situational and motivational cues render certain aspects more accessible than others and lead to moment-to-moment shifts in the phenomenal self. At the same time, as Jones and Pittman (1982) noted, the phenomenal self evolves over time to incorporate new behaviors. Although our senses of identity feel stable over time, we also recognize that we are not as liberal or extraverted, but more easygoing than we once were.Self-Prese...

Confirmatory bias in the evaluation of personality descriptions: Positive test strategies and output interference.

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Putting gender into context: An interactive model of gender-related behavior.

“…"In effect, the target person has become the person the perceiver expected" (Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981, p. 240). E. E. Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, and Skelton (1981) have used the term cany-over effects to refer to changes in the phenomenal self that result from self-presentational strategies; both self-perception and dissonance processes can account for these changes (E. E. Jones et al, 1981;Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986).…”

“…They argued that although the core self-concept may be resistant to change, the working self-concept varies with the social situation and depends on the social context for its expression. Analysis of the phenomenal self in terms of latitudes of acceptance and rejection offers a compatible approach to the question of stability and malleability of self-conceptions (E. E. Jones et al, 1981;Rhodewalt, in press;Rhodewalt & Agustsdottir, 1986).…”

Samoświadomość jako moderator wpływu dokonanej autoprezentacji na percepcję siebie po podjęciu decyzji w grze „dyktator”

“…W przeprowadzonym eksperymencie, jakkolwiek zastosowano rozdzielenie percepcyjne, a osoby badane myślały, że biorą udział w dwóch niepowiązanych badaniach, pomiar cech następował zaledwie kilka, kilkanaście minut po tym, jak dokonano autoprezentacji. Podobne, dość krótkotrwałe rozdzielenie czasowe stosowano w większości dotychczasowych badań (Cisek, 2003;Madeja-Bień, 2012;Schoeneman, 1981), a nawet w niektórych przypadkach nadzór nad obydwoma pomiarami sprawował ten sam eksperymentator, choć druga część odbywała się pod pretekstem innego badania (Jones i in., 1981;Rhodewalt, Agustsdottir, 1986) lub też tego samego badania (Schlenker, Weigold, 1990;Tice, 1992). Nie są nam natomiast znane badania dotyczące internalizacji autoprezentacji, w których stosuje się znaczne odroczenie czasowe.…”