Effects of subject sophistication and evaluation apprehension on aggressive responses to weapons.

Abstract

Weber and Cook suggested that evaluation apprehension and subject sophistication are powerful determinants of behavior in the laboratory but that much of the evidence concerning subject sophistication (deception and/or demand awareness) has been confounded with evaluation apprehension, In the present study, there was an experimental manipulation in a 3 X 2 design of three levels of subject sophistication and two levels of evaluation apprehension in an otherwise close replication of the seven-shock-unassociatedweapons condition from Berkowitz and LePage. A seventh condition replicated the procedures of their seven-shock-no-weapons condition. Eleven male university students were run in each condition. The results indicated that increased levels of both evaluation apprehension and subject sophistication led to decreased numbers of shock administered by subjects to their frustrators. The findings were interpreted as suggesting that the most naive and unsophisticated subjects should be used in laboratory studies of aggression so that inhibitions do not mask the effects of important independent variables.

Guns/no guns and the expression of social hostility

“…This outcome is partially or completely consistent with several other reports, including those by Buss et al (1972), Ellis et al (1971), Page and Scheidt (1971), and Turner and Simons (1974).…”

“…In fact, the results of the present study, as well as those of numerous other studies (e.g., Buss et al, 1972;Ellis et al, 1971;Page & Scheidt, 1971;Turner & Simons, 1974) indicate that the role of weapons in inhibiting violence seems to be at least as well documented as a weapons effect leading to aggression. A report in Psychology Today (Corey, 1979) also supported the possibility that weapons may inhibit violence in natural settings.…”

Deception in Experiments: Revisiting the Arguments in Its Defense

“…Turner and Simons (1974;see also Simons & Turner, 1976) challenged Page and Scheidt's results, and Turner, Simons, Berkowitz, and Frodi (1977) even suggested, "Perhaps the failures to replicate the weapons effect occurred because the researchers used subjects who were not naïve about deception studies or who were very apprehensive about the impression they might create" (p. 369). Although Page and Scheidt and Turner et al disagreed over the issue of how experience with deception alters experimental performance, they agreed that it does have this potential.…”

“…Nevertheless, a trend is discernable. The more concrete the foreknowledge, the more it affects participants' behavior: When participants received detailed tip-offs about the true purpose of the experiment (e.g., Levy, 1967;Turner & Simons, 1974), or were explicitly told that they would be deceived (Finney, 1987), or explicitly acknowledged awareness of experimental manipulation (Golding & Lichtenstein, 1970), suspicion altered experimental performance (albeit not necessarily on all dependent measures). In contrast, when participants were merely informed that some kind of deception might happen (D. F. Allen, 1983;Finney, 1987;Wiener & Erker, 1986) or were told the purpose of the study (without indicating the possibility of deception; Gallo, Smith, & Mumford, 1973), their performance did not differ from that of control participants who were not given this information (but see Spinner, Adair, & Barnes, 1977).…”

The weapons effect: Fact or artifact?

“…Subjects who had been exposed to deception in previous social psychology experiments gave fewer shocks when exposed to guns in an aggressive context. Turner and Simons (1974) found that nonapprehensive subjects who knew the purpose of the weapons gave fewer shocks. An attempt by Halderman and Jackson (1979) to replicate the hornhonking study by Turner et al (1975) in a rural community did not support the weapons effect.…”