Effects of ultimate ownership structure and corporate tax on capital structures: Evidence from Taiwan

Capital Structure, Profitability and Firm Value: Panel Evidence of Listed Firms in Kenya

“…It is important to note that leverage can affect profitability and firm value through taxation. Indeed, several empirical investigations have demonstrated a clear linkage between corporate taxation and capital structure (see, e.g., Barclay, et al, 2013;Lee and Kuo, 2014). However, our investigation shows that Kenya did not have a substantial change in corporate tax laws and rates during the study period.…”

Determinants of Indonesian Public Listed Companies to Participate in the Tax Amnesty

“…Ownership structure can be varied across the organization and affected the company direction (Badertscher et al, 2013;Holderness, 2016). Ownership can influence the management to do several actions and also different owner has the different style of monitoring and managing, including the decision regarding corporation's tax (Lee & Kuo, 2014). Shackelford & Shevlin (2001) stated that ownership structure might have influence over corporate tax avoidance practice, but notice that no or little research literature that explains the relationship between ownership structure and tax avoidance.…”

“…Anthony & Govindarajan (2007) explained that share-based compensation is one way for a manager to "feel and think" like an owner of a company, so it will be more aligning company and manager's goal. Lee & Kuo (2014) research found out that higher managerial ownership will reduce agency costs and reduce high-risk activities of the company including tax avoidance practice. However, Joulfaian (2000) research showed that company that managed by the manager that understand about tax will lead to non-compliant act since the manager will utilize loopholes in the tax laws to create tax avoidance.…”

Shareholders' control rights, family ownership and the firm's leverage decisions

“…In contrast, Santos et al (2014) examine a sample of 12 Western European firms and report a negative relationship between ownership concentration and firms leverage. Lee and Kuo (2014) document that shareholders with lower voting rights presumably prefer less leverage financing to avert the scrutiny of creditors.…”

“…Jensen (1986) predict that the firm leverage negatively impacts on external equity financing which in turn increase the shareholder stake of managerial ownership. In addition, controlling shareholders can limit the managerial entrenchment by acquiring less leverage finance which reduces the risk of financial distress (Lee & Kuo, 2014). Alternatively, entrenchment motives induce professional managers to enhance leverage level above the optimal threshold which more likely to boost their voting strength to influence corporate strategies (Harris & Raviv, 1988;Stulz, 1988).…”