This paper determines management behaviour for Tunisian banking industry between 1989 and 2006.Following the Granger causality, we examine the intertemporal relationships between bank efficiency, loan loss provision and capitalisation. The possible relationships between the variables imply different modes of management behaviour namely bad management, bad luck, skimping, and moral hazard behaviour. We extend the Granger causality model developed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) by applying G.M.M dynamic panel estimators on a panel of Tunisian commercial banks. The econometric results suggest that the intertemporal relationships between the loan loss provision and productive efficiency are checked in only one direction. Our data provide evidence for the bad luck hypothesis suggesting the exogeneity of bad loans triggering inefficiency. In addition, we find no evidence of bad management hypothesis for the Tunisian commercial banks. Thus, these banks adopted a skimping behaviour over 1989-2006 period. Finally, the moral hazard behaviour, according to which the managers of the thinly capitalised banks assume additional portfolio risk, was identified in the context of the Tunisian banks.Keywords: Cost/Profit Efficiency, Granger Causality, Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Managerial BehaviourIn competitive markets, environmental pressures such as bank regulations and the organisational structures of markets and firms condition the response and effort of management towards improving efficiency (Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992). Differences in bank organizational structures, for instance, in terms of their ownership might explain variations in inefficiencies because of principal agent problems that offset the conditioning effect that environmental pressure brings to bear on managerial effort. This is an empirical issue, which has received considerable attention in the bank efficiency literature albeit yielding somewhat mixed or inconclusive results (see Cebenoyan and al., 1993;Berger and Humphrey, 1997;Altunbas and al., 2001;Hasan and Marton, 2003;Weill, 2004;Bonin and al., 2005;Fries and Taci, 2005).One limitation of the bank ownership-efficiency literature is that, in general, it simply determines whether banks organised under one ownership model are significantly more efficient than banks organised in another way. Whilst this literature is informative for bank regulators and policy makers especially when subsequent analyses quantifies the differences in the characteristics of efficient and inefficient banks, it says little about management behaviour.As a complement to those studies that differentiate efficiency levels between ownership models, there is a smaller literature that relates aspects of bank management with efficiency. For instance, DeYoung and al. (2001) have studied the management structure of small US banks finding that management behaviour is aligned with shareholder interests through incentive and monitoring procedures at the most profit efficient banks. Managerial prudence in terms of a higher level ...