Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret

Chakravorti, Bhaskar

doi:10.2307/2526982

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…We leave this question for future work. In asymmetric information domains, the results have been largely negative (Palfrey and Srivastava, 1987;Chakravorti, 1992Chakravorti, , 1993 to begin with. However, given the satisfaction of an incentive compatibility requirement, positive results emerge.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

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Credible implementation

Chakravorty¹,

Corchón

Wilkie

2006

Games and Economic Behavior

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The theory of implementation abounds with mechanisms with intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it is not in the designer's best interest to go through with the reward/punishment in the "subgame" arising from some disequilibrium play. This would make the mechanism's outcome function non-credible. We define a notion of credible implementation and, in the domain of exchange economies, we show that (a) the non-dictatorial Pareto correspondence can be credibly implemented (b) there is no credibly implementable Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice rule (SCR) and (c) there is no credibly implementable Pareto-efficient and envy-free SCR. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for credible implementability of SCR. The main implication is that it is sub-optimal for the designer to be endowed with "too much" information about the economy. Finally, we show that the negative results persist under weaker credibility requirements.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…We are interested in "global" implementability as in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) and Chakravorti (1992Chakravorti ( , 1993, i.e. the implementability of ϕ in every planning problem.…”

Section: A U T H O R ' S P E R S O N a L C O P Ymentioning

confidence: 99%

Credible implementation

Chakravorty¹,

Corchón

Wilkie

2006

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…41 Variants of this example were developed in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), Chakravorti (1992) and Serrano and Vohra (2001 …”

Section: Note First That Incentive Compatibility Is Not a Constraint mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

Serrano¹

2004

SIAM Rev.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. Suppose that the goals of a society can be summarized in a social choice rule, i.e., a mapping from relevant underlying parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the agents in society. The implementation problem is then formulated: under what circumstances can one design a mechanism so that the private information is truthfully elicited and the social optimum ends up being implemented? In designing such a mechanism, appropriate incentives will have to be given to the agents so that they do not wish to misrepresent their information. The theory of implementation or mechanism design formalizes this "social engineering" problem and provides answers to the question just posed. I survey the theory of implementation in this article, emphasizing the results based on two behavioral assumptions for the agents (dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium). Examples discussed include voting, and the allocation of private and public goods under complete and incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C72, D78, D82. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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“…3 However, when one considers multivalued sets, mixed Bayesian monotonicity is more restrictive: it only reduces to Bayesian monotonicity when the set satisfies a convex range property over the set of pure deceptions. It is well-known that Bayesian monotonicity can sometimes be extremely restrictive (e.g., Palfrey and Srivastava, 1987;Chakravorti, 1992), and hence so will be its mixed counterpart. On the other hand, in environments in which Bayesian monotonicity is permissive (e.g., Matsushima, 1993), mixed Bayesian monotonicity will rule out those social choice sets that do not have a convex range.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation

Serrano¹,

Vohra²

2010

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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a b s t r a c tWe characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixed-strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It is shown that, in economic environments with at least three agents, mixed Bayesian implementation is equivalent to mixed Bayesian monotonicity, incentive compatibility and closure. For implementing a social choice function, the case of two-agents is also covered by these conditions and mixed Bayesian monotonicity reduces to Bayesian monotonicity. Following parallel steps, mixed virtual implementation is shown to be equivalent to mixed virtual monotonicity, incentive compatibility and closure. The key condition, mixed virtual monotonicity, is argued to be very weak. In particular, it is weaker than Abreu-Matsushima's measurability, thereby implying that: (1) virtual implementation in mixed Bayesian equilibrium is more permissive than virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies, and (2) non-regular mechanisms are essential for the implementation of rules in that gap.

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Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret

Cited by 10 publications

References 8 publications

Credible implementation

Credible implementation

The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation

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