Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice

Tadenuma, Koichi

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2844

Cited by 49 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The conflict is so severe that if one insists on obeying the Pareto principle, a radical revision of the way egalitarian principles are handled is needed. This conflict appears to be closely related to a similar conflict uncovered by Kolm (1972), Suzumura (1981a,b) and Tadenuma (2002), regarding the no-envy criterion. For instance Tadenuma (2002) proves that any Paretian social ranking which relies upon the no-envy test in case of indecisiveness of the Pareto criterion fails to be acyclic.…”

Section: Marc Fleurbaey 1 Alain Trannoysupporting

confidence: 73%

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The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian

Fleurbaey

Trannoy

2003

Social Choice and Welfare

100

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Abstract. In a one-good world, there is a nice correspondence between the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer and social welfare dominance. In this paper we study the case of multiple goods (without using prices as a means to come back to one dimension), and show that many results of the onedimensional setting carry over to the multidimensional case when individuals are assumed to have identical preferences. But the nice correspondence breaks down as soon as individual preferences display minimal differences, and multidimensional versions of the transfer principle clash with the Pareto principle. This analysis reveals an interesting connection with the theory of fair allocation, since multidimensional transfer principles are closely related to the no-domination criterion, a weak version of the no-envy criterion. IntroductionAmong the many issues to which Louis Gevers has contributed, comes to mind the construction of social rankings in economic environments and more precisely in the Edgeworth box (Gevers 1986). The social choice problem has more structure when one takes account of the scarcity of resources and some basic features of individual preferences like monotonicity and convexity.

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Section: Marc Fleurbaey 1 Alain Trannoysupporting

confidence: 73%

“…This is the suggestion made by Tadenuma (2002) with the Pareto criterion and the equityas-no-envy-criterion. Tadenuma formalizes two principles.…”

Section: The Trade-off Between Dominance and Paretomentioning

confidence: 81%

The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian

Fleurbaey

Trannoy

2003

Social Choice and Welfare

100

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“…KS: Among the Japanese scholars active at the time, there were two who made seminal contributions to our subject, viz., Ken-Ichi Inada (1925-2002 and Yasusuke Murakami (1931Murakami ( -1993. However, they were teaching at different universities (Inada was affiliated with Tokyo Metropolitan University before joining the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, and Murakami was teaching at the University of Tokyo).…”

Section: Wb and Mfmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Interview with Kotaro Suzumura

Bossert

Fleurbaey

2014

Soc Choice Welf

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Kotaro Suzumura (KS): My education in economics began at Hitotsubashi University in 1962, which is one of the best national universities in Japan as far as the humanities and social sciences go. It was the good old days, and we were not trained in the way our students are trained nowadays. Many teachers talked more about their own interests rather than teaching standard courses and following a standard curriculum.I still remember the first day of the class on development economics taught by a senior professor, who I later learned was a famous scholar. It was an extreme example of non-standard education in these days. I was then a third year undergraduate. Without giving even a word of introduction, he turned his back to us and began to draw a colourful picture on the blackboard, which took more than thirty minutes. Students were puzzled and a stir ran through the classroom. When he completed his artistic work, what appeared on the blackboard was Siddhartha Gautama sitting on a lotus calyx. He turned to us and declared that it represented the economic nirvana. Without uttering any further word, he went out of the classroom to take a puff at a pipe. Needless to say, his theatrical performance took me by surprise. I could have enjoyed it if I had not been pressed by the strong innate desire to pursue my own interest in the performance characteristics of democratic methods of decision-making. I was aware that I could not do so without rigorous discipline if I were to aspire for a sensible academic career. Thus, I decided to spend more time in libraries than in classrooms if I found that the class was unlikely to serve to this end. As a consequence, I became more a self-trained scholar through books of my own choice rather than a well-trained scholar. Needless to say, there were several excellent classes, which helped me greatly in my search for scholarly endeavours. I was also fortunate enough to encounter a few excellent books on microeconomics and related disciplines in the library, which I found intellectually fascinating.

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“…See Temkin (1986Temkin ( , 1993 and Ebert and Cowell (2004) for approaches to income inequality measurement that explicitly refer to envy-freeness. 3 Tadenuma (2002) studies this compromise solution in a formal setting similar to ours. In addition, he shows that the binary relation that naturally extends this solution (for any two allocations, prefer the Pareto dominant allocation if there is Pareto dominance, and prefer the envy-minimizing allocation if there is no Pareto dominance) violates the essential property of transitivity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy

Bosmans

Öztürk

2017

Soc Choice Welf

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We characterize a class of envy-as-inequity measures. There are three key axioms. Decomposability requires that overall envy is the sum of the envy within and between subgroups. The other two axioms deal with the two-individual setting and specify how the envy measure should react to simple changes in the individuals' commodity bundles. The characterized class measures how much one individual envies another individual by the relative utility difference (using the envious' utility function) between the bundle of the envied and the bundle of the envious, where the utility function that must be used to represent the ordinal preferences is the 'ray' utility function. The class measures overall envy by the sum of these (transformed) relative utility differences. We discuss our results in the light of previous contributions to envy measurement and multidimensional inequality measurement.

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Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice

Cited by 49 publications

References 9 publications

The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian

The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian

An Interview with Kotaro Suzumura

An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy

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