Efficiency in auctions with (failed) resale

Pagnozzi, Marco; Saral, Krista Jabs

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.017

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(33 reference statements)

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“…24 In this respect the bidder's incentive to reduce demand and the auction price is analogous to a monopolist maximising its profit by restricting supply. 25 Post-auction acquisition of the auctioned spectrum through trading or mergers could also enhance the profitability of demand reduction -see Pagnozzi and Saral (2019).…”

Section: Conclusion: the Strengths And Limitations Of Auction Formatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing an auction format

Myers¹

2023

Spectrum Auctions: Designing Markets to Benefit the Public, Industry and the Economy

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This chapter explores in detail how the main formats for spectrum auctions operate, looking at: Simultaneous Multiple Round Ascending Auctions (SMRAs) with individual bids and a first-price rule; and Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) with package bids in an initial stage of multiple rounds, followed by sealed bids and a second-price rule; and less commonly used, a third format of sealed bids in a single round.• Auction design for spectrum involves many trade-offs because there is no perfect design. To maximise economic efficiency, the regulator seeks to encourage straightforward bidding. Challenges include assisting bidders to refine their values through price discovery, to manage their bid strategies given their budget constraints, and to mitigate risks from substitution and aggregation effects.

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Section: Conclusion: the Strengths And Limitations Of Auction Formatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing an auction format

Myers¹

2023

Spectrum Auctions: Designing Markets to Benefit the Public, Industry and the Economy

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“…The third component of our literature framework is resale. Indeed, previous research has predominantly focused on studying resale behavior among consumers within the supply chain [39][40][41][42][43] or between the manufacturer and the e-retailer [10,16,17,38]. The literature has primarily explored the actions of end-consumers in terms of reselling products.…”

Section: Resalementioning

confidence: 99%

To Compete or to Collaborate? Logistics Service Sharing and Retailers’ Resale in Competitive Online Channels

Zhang

2023

Systems

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The prosperity of e-commerce has made more and more businesses willing to enter the e-commerce market, which has also brought a series of strategic collaboration between firms. This study considers game models with and without collaboration between the platform and the retailer. An e-commerce platform has relative logistics service sharing advantages while the retailer has relative procurement advantages. We formulated a multichannel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers to explore the feasibility of the above strategic collaboration model. We utilized the Stackelberg game and Nash game approaches to obtain equilibrium solutions under both cooperative and noncooperative scenarios. Through a further analysis, we determined the impacts of the logistics sensitivity, the cost of the unit logistics service effort, the price of shared logistics service per unit, and the price competition intensity on optimal prices, the logistics service efforts, and the profits. Moreover, the collaborative exchange of advantages between the platform and the retailer needs to consider the interests of participating manufacturers in the game. Our extension suggests all three firms should actively promote deeper collaboration.

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“…Table 4.5 summarizes total earnings, combining both auction and resale, conditional on at least one speculator entering. 18 A speculator could make positive earnings by purchasing a unit in the auction and reselling it at a higher price, but losses were possible if a speculator failed to resell. 19 When one speculator entered the auction he did make positive earnings on average, especially in the 2SE treatment.…”

Section: % (Obs)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale

Pagnozzi¹,

Saral

2018

Exp Econ

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We experimentally analyze the role of speculators, who have no use value for the objects on sale, in auctions. The environment is a uniform-price sealed-bid auction for 2 identical objects, followed by a free-form bargaining resale market. There is always one positive-value bidder, and either one to two speculators who may choose whether to enter the auction. We show that the bidder accommodates speculators by reducing demand in the auction and subsequently purchasing in the resale market, which encourages entry by speculators. The presence of multiple speculators induces each speculator to enter less often, but increases competition in the auction and the auction price. Speculators earn positive pro…ts on average, except when multiple speculators enter the auction.JEL Classi…cation: D44, C90.

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Efficiency in auctions with (failed) resale

Cited by 6 publications

References 27 publications

Choosing an auction format

Choosing an auction format

To Compete or to Collaborate? Logistics Service Sharing and Retailers’ Resale in Competitive Online Channels

Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale

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