Efficiency in Contests Between Groups

Effort Provision and Incentivisation in Tullock Group-Contests with Many Groups: An Explicit Characterisation

“…8 The algorithmic structure allows for the identification of some important structural properties of equilibria -number of active groups and degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity of the endogenous incentivisation schemes. In this respect, our approach complements that of Hartley (2017) -that tackles the same tractability issue, but takes another route: he shows that a group-contest game can be represented as a simpler contest game played by single agents (interpreted as the groups' leaders), each minimising an 'artificial cost function' representative of a group's 'typical' preferences. This paper is organised as follows.…”

Effort complementarity and role assignments in group contests

“…Kobayashi and Konishi (2021) extend this condition to the relative sizes between group members' effort complementarity and elasticity of effort cost with a CES function, and show a conflict of interest between the group manager and the group member. Kobayashi et al (2024) endogenize the prize depending on the amount of total effort in the contest and characterize the prize allocation with a homothetic effort‐aggregator function following Hartley's (2017) cost minimization approach 3 . Our study aims to clarify the rules of role assignment and prize and resource allocation, characterized by complementarity among group members' efforts in a CES function.…”