Efficiency loss due to distortions in Dutch milk quota trade

Boots, M.G.; Lansink, A.G.J.M. Oude; Peerlings, J.H.M.

doi:10.1093/erae/24.1.31

Cited by 50 publications

(37 citation statements)

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“…Oskam and Osinga (1982) estimate the elasticity at 0.29 in a market that was not yet limited by milk and manure quotas. This is not that different from the value in Boots et al (1997).…”

Section: The Volume Supplied In a Situation Without A Quotacontrasting

confidence: 54%

“…In addition, it is very difficult to estimate output price reactions based on actual market results. Boots et al (1997) use an optimising model to simulate what the aggregated supply response would have been in 1992/1993 and arrive at an elasticity of 0.26. Oskam and Osinga (1982) estimate the elasticity at 0.29 in a market that was not yet limited by milk and manure quotas.…”

Section: The Volume Supplied In a Situation Without A Quotamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The results for emissions in column 2 are based on the assumption of a larger milk quota. An elasticity of 0.26 is used (Boots et al, 1997) and a world market price of € 0.19. The figures in column 3 are also based on a larger milk quota, with an elasticity of 0.26 (Boots et al, 1997) and a world market price of € 0.24.…”

Section: Emission Factors ) ( Q Zmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An elasticity of 0.26 is used (Boots et al, 1997) and a world market price of € 0.19. The figures in column 3 are also based on a larger milk quota, with an elasticity of 0.26 (Boots et al, 1997) and a world market price of € 0.24. This world market price is higher than that used for column 2 because the EU is a major supplier of dairy products on the world market.…”

Section: Emission Factors ) ( Q Zmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Environmental Harm of Hidden Subsidies: Global Warming and Acidification

Beers

Bergh²

2009

AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment

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PrefaceThe government uses all kinds of policy instruments to intervene in the economic process. The standard reason given for government intervention is market failure due to so-called external effects. If the external effects are positive, the market tends towards under-investment or underproduction compared with the social optimum. With negative external effects the result is precisely the opposite, namely over-investment or overproduction. For example, investment in R&D is characterised by knowledge 'leakage' to competitors who profit from it without having to pay for it. If the government wants to prevent under-investment in R&D, then it must provide subsidies to compensate for these 'leakage' effects. Looked at from the other direction, the theory of prosperity says that tax should be levied in the case of negative external effects.This study shows that well-intentioned public policy can have unintended (and unnoticed) side effects on the environment. Scientists, policy-makers and the public at large seem insufficiently aware of this problem.This report has been compiled in response to the request from the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment for a methodological study of the environmental effects of policy measures in the Netherlands. The study has produced a scientific method for charting first order environmental effects in a transparent, rapid and flexible way. Application of the method to a number of subsidies in the energy, agriculture, transport, and tourism sectors shows that there can be significant first order effects on the environment. In principle the method can be applied more broadly, e.g. for questions relating to the lack of a public policy. As long as it is applied responsibly the method is a useful aid for policymakers.

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“…Oskam and Osinga (1982) estimate the elasticity at 0.29 in a market that was not yet limited by milk and manure quotas. This is not that different from the value in Boots et al (1997).…”

Section: The Volume Supplied In a Situation Without A Quotacontrasting

confidence: 54%

Section: The Volume Supplied In a Situation Without A Quotamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Emission Factors ) ( Q Zmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Emission Factors ) ( Q Zmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Environmental Harm of Hidden Subsidies: Global Warming and Acidification

Beers

Bergh²

2009

AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment

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“…However, the allocation of entitlements is 3 There is a large related literature on the effects of tradability of production quota (Alston, 1981;Burrell, 1989;Babcock and Foster, 1992;Guyomard, et al, 1996;Sumner and Wolf. 1996;Boots, Oude Lansink, and Peerlings, 1997;Bureau et al, 1997;Bureau, Guyomard, and Requillart, 2001). …”

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confidence: 99%

Static and Dynamic Distributional Effects of Decoupled Payments: Single Farm Payments in the European Union

2008

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper analyses the distributional effects of decoupled Single Farm Payments (SFP) in the European Union. In a static world the SFP benefit only farmers, irrespective of the implemented SFP model and irrespective of whether entitlements are tradable or not, except when the size of the allocated entitlements is larger than the eligible area and/or if entrants are eligible for the SFP. Then the SFP gets either partially or fully capitalized into land values and landowners benefit. In a dynamic world the effects depend on the nature of structural change, on the tradability of entitlements, and on the implementation model.

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