Efficiency of Subsidy Schemes in Reducing Waiting Times for Public Health-Care Services

Guo, Pengfei; Lindsey, Robin; Qian, Qu

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2133054

Cited by 7 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Another related study is that of Guo et al (2012), who examine the effect of different forms of patient subsidies when a for-profit hospital sector operates alongside a non-profit hospital sector.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For s = 0, our formulation applies to healthcare systems under which patients receive no subsidies for seeking care in the for-profit sector. For s > 0, the price p 2 that patients pay for admission to H2 is essentially a "top-up" price to the public funder's subsidy s. That approach is taken in the United Kingdom (Cooper et al 2012) as well as in Canada and Hong Kong (Guo et al 2012). A critical aspect of this setup is that it allows us to discuss both settings in a unified manner.…”

Section: Equilibrium Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, the UK's National Health Service (NHS) allows its patients to seek treatment in private, for-profit hospitals provided those institutions are willing to be reimbursed at NHS rates (Cooper et al 2012); similar arrangements have been discussed in Sweden (Mason 2008). The governments of Australia, Canada, and Hong Kong have all considered subsidizing part of the treatment costs incurred in the for-profit sector (Guo et al 2012). 1 To avoid any confusion about the terms "private" and "public" hospital and since we are interested primarily in the effects of a hospital's objective, we shall distinguish only between non-profit and for-profit hospitals.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Competition and the Operational Performance of Hospitals: The Role of Hospital Objectives

Andritsos

Aflaki

2014

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Equilibrium Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Competition and the Operational Performance of Hospitals: The Role of Hospital Objectives

Andritsos

Aflaki

2014

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Guo et al . considered a healthcare system where the public sector is the major service provider. They modeled the public sector as a M / M /1 queuing system and analyzed the efficiency of two different subsidy schemes designed to divert a portion of patients to the private sector to alleviate the burden on the public sector.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Guo et al . investigated the effectiveness of various governmental subsidy schemes to reduce patient waiting time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two‐tier healthcare service systems and cost of waiting for patients

Wan

Wang

2017

Appl Stoch Models Bus & Ind

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Waiting has been a significant concern for healthcare services. We address this issue in the context of a two‐tier service system in this study. A two‐tier healthcare service system consists of two different service providers, typically one public service provider and one private service provider. In a baseline model, the two service providers are modeled by two queue servers, which charge each patient a common fixed fee for the service. Then, we study a queue model in which one service provider offers a subsidy or charges a premium while the other maintains the fixed service fee. This system provides a mechanism to segment patients along their waiting time cost through price discrimination. We analyze the problem from both the perspective of minimizing total waiting cost for all patients and the perspective of maximizing social gain for the public service provider or profit for the private service provider. We show that this model can significantly alleviate the burden of waiting for patients. The study addresses the design, the efficiency, and the implementation of two‐tier healthcare service systems. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

show abstract

Competition and The Operational Performance of Hospitals: The Role of Hospital Objectives

Andritsos

Aflaki

2015

Production and Operations Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

W e examine the effect of a hospital's objective (i.e., non-profit vs. for-profit) in hospital markets for elective care.Using game-theoretic analysis and queueing models to capture the operational performance of hospitals, we compare the equilibrium behavior of three market settings in terms of such criteria as waiting times and patient costs from waiting and hospital payments. In the first setting, a monopoly, patients are served exclusively by a single non-profit hospital; in the second, a homogeneous duopoly, patients are served by two competing non-profit hospitals. In our third setting, a heterogeneous duopoly, the market is served by one non-profit hospital and one for-profit hospital. A non-profit hospital provides free care to patients, although they may have to wait; for-profit hospitals charge a fee to provide care with minimal waiting. A comparison between the monopolistic and each of the duopolistic settings reveals that the introduction of competition can hamper a hospital's ability to attain economies of scale and can also increase waiting times. Moreover, the presence of a for-profit sector may be desirable only when the hospital market is sufficiently competitive. A comparison across the duopolistic settings indicates that the choice between homogeneous and heterogeneous competition depends on the patients' willingness to wait before receiving care and the reimbursement level of the non-profit sector. When the public funder is not financially constrained, the presence of a for-profit sector may allow the funder to lower both the financial costs of providing coverage and the total costs to patients. Finally, our analysis suggests that the public funder should exercise caution when using policy tools that support the for-profit sector-for example, patient subsidies -because such tools may increase patient costs in the long run; it might be preferable to raise the non-profit sector's level of reimbursement.

show abstract

Efficiency of Subsidy Schemes in Reducing Waiting Times for Public Health-Care Services

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Competition and the Operational Performance of Hospitals: The Role of Hospital Objectives

Competition and the Operational Performance of Hospitals: The Role of Hospital Objectives

Two‐tier healthcare service systems and cost of waiting for patients

Competition and The Operational Performance of Hospitals: The Role of Hospital Objectives

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About