Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort

Abstract

Abstract:A rule that constrains decision-makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources-inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game-theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two-inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms-control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies.

Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks

“…To our knowledge, Avenhaus and Kilgour (2004) and Avenhaus and Canty (2005) are the only researchers who focus specifically on deterring undesirable behavior through inspection. However, in their model, inspection effort must be divided among multiple inspectees, because inspection of different nations must be conducted in different locations.…”

“…More recently, Avenhaus and Kilgour (2004) extend the inspection game to find the level of resources needed to deter all violations, and also how to allocate limited resources among multiple inspectees to minimize expected damage. Avenhaus and Canty (2005) model inspection over multiple time periods.…”

Deterrence, technology, and the sensible distribution of arms control verification resources

“…The case in which resources are sufficient to be distributed among two States has been analyzed in [5]. The subject of [5] was the dependence of inspection policies on the analytical properties of detection probabilities as functions of inspection effort.…”

“…The case in which resources are sufficient to be distributed among two States has been analyzed in [5]. The subject of [5] was the dependence of inspection policies on the analytical properties of detection probabilities as functions of inspection effort. Here, the emphasis is placed on the modeling of state-specific incentives for illegal behavior and the relationship between those incentives and states' technical capabilities.…”

Weighted search games

“…Typically, the inspector's resources are limited so that the verification can only be partial. Other related inspection games are studied in [4,5,8,11,12]. In the game studied here the inspector makes a single inspection on each column of L (each column can represent a different day, zone, product, etc.…”