Efficient Mixing of Arbitrary Ballots with Everlasting Privacy: How to Verifiably Mix the PPATC Scheme

Gjøsteen, Kristian; Haines, Thomas; Solberg, Morten Rotvold

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-70852-8_6

Cited by 3 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…We conjecture that the mixing version of [22] achieves all security properties it was designed for originally: practical everlasting privacy, computational privacy under the assumption at least one mix server and at least a threshold of trustees are honest, public verifiability, and accountability. Because Gjøsteen, Haines, and Solberg [30] demonstrate that the PPAT protocol can be instantiated to achieve a performance similar to state-of-the-art NIZKP of shuffle [68], we conclude that the PPAT protocol offers a reasonable solution for secure e-voting with everlasting privacy that can even handle complex ballots.…”

Section: Conceptmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…We study sub-class B-ID-MIX in Sec. 7, where we show that the mixing version of [22] offers the most reasonable approach, including the works built upon it [30,34,61].…”

Section: Identifiable Ballots (B-id)mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Everlasting privacy is based on the unconditionally privacy-preserving technique used to tally ballots. Existing protocols in B-ID are [11,21,22,25,26,29,30,34,55,56,61,69].…”

Section: Identifiable Ballots (B-id)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We further subdivide B-ID according to the privacy-preserving technique that is used in the tallying phase: The outcome of this procedure contains all voters' choices in a permuted order. Existing protocols in B-ID-MIX are [11,22,25,26,30,34,55,56,61].…”

Section: Identifiable Ballots (B-id)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We study existing protocols [11,22,25,26,30,34,55,56,61] in the sub-class B-ID-MIX, where voters' identifiable ballots are mixed (see Sec. 3).…”

Section: B-id-mixmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

SoK: Secure E-Voting with Everlasting Privacy

Haines

Mosaheb

Müller

et al. 2023

PoPETs

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Vote privacy is a fundamental right, which needs to be protected not only during an election, or for a limited time afterwards, but for the foreseeable future. Numerous electronic voting (e-voting) protocols have been proposed to address this challenge, striving for everlasting privacy. This property guarantees that even computationally unbounded adversaries cannot break privacy of past elections. The broad interest in secure e-voting with everlasting privacy has spawned a large variety of protocols over the last three decades. These protocols differ in many aspects, in particular the precise security properties they aim for, the threat scenarios they consider, and the privacy-preserving techniques they employ. Unfortunately, these differences are often opaque, making analysis and comparison cumbersome. In order to overcome this non-transparent state of affairs, we systematically analyze all e-voting protocols designed to provide everlasting privacy. First, we illustrate the relations and dependencies between all these different protocols. Next, we analyze in depth which protocols do provide secure and efficient approaches to e-voting with everlasting privacy under realistic assumptions, and which ones do not. Eventually, based on our extensive and detailed treatment, we identify which research problems in this field have already been solved, and which ones are still open. Altogether, our work offers a well - founded reference point for conducting research on secure e - voting with everlasting privacy as well as for future - proofing privacy in real - world electronic elections.

show abstract

Section: Conceptmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…We study sub-class B-ID-MIX in Sec. 7, where we show that the mixing version of [22] offers the most reasonable approach, including the works built upon it [30,34,61].…”

Section: Identifiable Ballots (B-id)mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Everlasting privacy is based on the unconditionally privacy-preserving technique used to tally ballots. Existing protocols in B-ID are [11,21,22,25,26,29,30,34,55,56,61,69].…”

Section: Identifiable Ballots (B-id)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Identifiable Ballots (B-id)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We study existing protocols [11,22,25,26,30,34,55,56,61] in the sub-class B-ID-MIX, where voters' identifiable ballots are mixed (see Sec. 3).…”

Section: B-id-mixmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

SoK: Secure E-Voting with Everlasting Privacy

Haines

Mosaheb

Müller

et al. 2023

PoPETs

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show abstract

Direct and Transparent Voter Verification with Everlasting Receipt-Freeness

Mosaheb,

Rønne,

Ryan

et al. 2024

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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We present a new verifiable voting scheme based on the Hyperion scheme but providing everlasting privacy and receipt-freeness. As with Selene and Hyperion, it provides a direct form of E2E verifiability: voters verify the presence of their votes in plaintext in the tally. However, in contrast to Selene or Hyperion, the privacy of this protocol is everlasting. In addition, our protocol offers the novel feature of everlasting receipt-freeness and coercion mitigation.

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DeVoS: Deniable Yet Verifiable Vote Updating

Müller,

Pejó,

Pryvalov

2024

PoPETs

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Internet voting systems are supposed to meet the same high standards as traditional paper-based systems when used in real political elections: freedom of choice, universal and equal suffrage, secrecy of the ballot, and independent verifiability of the election result. Although numerous Internet voting systems have been proposed to achieve these challenging goals simultaneously, few come close in reality. We propose a novel publicly verifiable and practically efficient Internet voting system, DeVoS, that advances the state of the art. The main feature of DeVoS is its ability to protect voters' freedom of choice in several dimensions. First, voters in DeVoS can intuitively update their votes in a way that is deniable to observers but verifiable by the voters; in this way voters can secretly overwrite potentially coerced votes. Second, in addition to (basic) vote privacy, DeVoS also guarantees strong participation privacy by end-to-end hiding which voters have submitted ballots and which have not. Finally, DeVoS is fully compatible with Perfectly Private Audit Trail, a state-of-the-art Internet voting protocol with practical everlasting privacy. In combination, DeVoS offers a new way to secure free Internet elections with strong and long-term privacy properties.

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Efficient Mixing of Arbitrary Ballots with Everlasting Privacy: How to Verifiably Mix the PPATC Scheme

Cited by 3 publications

References 15 publications

SoK: Secure E-Voting with Everlasting Privacy

SoK: Secure E-Voting with Everlasting Privacy

Direct and Transparent Voter Verification with Everlasting Receipt-Freeness

DeVoS: Deniable Yet Verifiable Vote Updating

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