Efficient Responses to Targeted Cash Transfers

Attanasio, Orazio; Lechêne, Valérie

doi:10.1086/674968

Cited by 157 publications

(109 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Unfortunately the dataset does not contain the necessary information to run a test of collective efficiency. However, two recent papers by Bobonis (2009) and Attanasio and Lechene (2014) show that, in a context very similar to ours, households make collective efficient use of resources coming from a conditional cash transfers program similar to AAC. Although this is only an indirect evidence that our households make also efficient use of this cash, it tells us that assuming efficiency is not unreasonable.…”

supporting

confidence: 53%

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How Cash Transfers Improve Child Development

Tommasi

2015

SSRN Journal

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This paper investigates the mechanism(s) through which a large exogenous shock in income affects the investment parents make in child development. The identification strategy exploits the random assignment of a conditional cash transfer program in rural Nicaragua whose objective was to benefit households with very young children. Payments were allocated to mothers who were also subject to repeated information on the importance of varied diets, health and education matters.We show that the cash transfers improved child development via a strong income effect and a change in knowledge toward child rearing practices. However, both mechanisms were effective only in those households where the mother was likely to be already powerful at the baseline. In light of the theoretical model that guides the empirical analysis, we can interpret these results as the mother having a larger marginal willingness to pay for children. However, this difference in preferences starts to play a role only when her decision power is strong, because in this case she is more capable of using at best the additional resources that are made at her disposal.JEL Codes: D13, I15, J13, J16, O15

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supporting

confidence: 53%

“…The surveys include detailed information on expenditures at household level 6 , and ex- 6 The modules on expenditure information were taken from the 2001 Nicaragua Living Standards 11 tensive information on child development. There are up to 10 measures of early childhood well-being, depending on the age of the children.…”

Section: Evaluation Samplementioning

confidence: 99%

How Cash Transfers Improve Child Development

Tommasi

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…On the other hand, studies that fail to reject efficiency tend to focus on consumption in developing countries (e.g. Bobonis, 2009;Attanasio and Lechene, 2014) or labor supply in developed countries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Familial Ties

Kazianga

Wahhaj

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn this paper, we investigate the link between intra-household resource allocation and familial ties between household members. We show that, within the same geographic, economic and social environments, households where members have 'stronger' familial ties (e.g. a nuclear family household) achieve near Pareto efficient allocation of productive resources and Pareto efficient allocation of consumption while households with 'weaker' familial ties (e.g. an extended family household) do not. We propose a theoretical model of the household based on the idea that altruism between household members vary with familial ties which generates predictions consistent with the observed empirical patterns. Non-Technical SummaryThe question as to how resources are allocated within households has long been of interest to economists. Particularly in societies where state support and market institutions are weak, the household remains an important unit of production, and investment in the human capital of children.The two theories of intra-household allocation that have received the most attention in the academic literature and tested most frequently using household data are the Unitary Model and the Collective Model. The Unitary Model, which postulates that the household behaves as if it were a single individual, has been consistently rejected by empirical evidence. On the other hand, tests of the Collective Model, which postulates that household members with conflicting preferences are able to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes, have yielded mixed results --not rejected for labour supply decisions in developed countries or consumption decisions in developing countries, but commonly rejected for production in African households.In this paper we investigate intra-household resource allocation in rural Burkina Faso and show that, within the same geographic, economic and social environment nuclear-family households achieve near Pareto efficiency in allocating productive resources and Pareto efficient allocation of consumption, while extended-family households do not.We propose a theory where household members with closer familial ties exhibit higher levels of altruism towards each other, which in turn motivate them to make intra-household transfers close to that required for efficiency. The theory predicts that household members who share a nuclear family tie (as opposed to an extended-family tie or no family ties) should contribute higher ...

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“…To solve these empirical issues we will require exogenous events that change wages and the marriage market, something that a newer generation of collective models is now addressing, such as the paper by Attanasio and Lechene (2014) who use the experiment as an exogenous shifter in female bargaining power.…”

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confidence: 99%

Intrahousehold Inequality

Chiappori¹,

Meghir²

2014

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Studies of inequality often ignore resource allocation within the household. In doing so they miss an important element of the distribution of welfare that can vary dramatically depending on overall environmental and economic factors. Thus, measures of inequality that ignore intra household allocations are both incomplete and misleading. We discuss determinants of intrahousehold allocation of resources and welfare. We show how the sharing rule, which characterizes the within household allocations, can be identified from data on household consumption and labor supply. We also argue that a measure based on estimates of the sharing rule is is inadequate as an approach that seeks to understand how welfare is distributed in the population because it ignores public goods and the allocation of time to market work, leisure and household production. We discuss a money metric alternative, that fully characterizes the utility level reached by the agent. We then review the current literature on the estimation of the sharing rule based on a number of approaches, including the use of distribution factors as well as preference restrictions.

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Efficient Responses to Targeted Cash Transfers

Cited by 157 publications

References 28 publications

How Cash Transfers Improve Child Development

How Cash Transfers Improve Child Development

Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Familial Ties

Intrahousehold Inequality

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