Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Abstract

In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals (1 and 2) who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function of individual as a function of this individual's own effort and the effort applied by individual , j i j ≠ , in three distinct cases. Next, we compute the ith individual's best response function. Finally, we analyze effort application by two identical pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations. In the first (second) nation, arranged marriages are uncommon (common) and hence it is relatively difficult (straightforward) for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. We explain why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the second nation.

Understanding Custom Of Forced Marriages: An Exploratory Study Of Bihar

“…"History of Human Marriage" defines marriage as "the more or less durable connection between male and female lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of offspring." 1 "Marriage is one of the general social organizations set up to control and direct the existence of humankind; it is the endorsed social example by which at least two-man set up a family" 2 . The marriages are traditionally transformed into their responsibilities of two individuals and closely associated with the culture and society.…”