Effort, Intensity and Position Taking

Bawn, Kathleen; Koger, Gregory

doi:10.1177/0951629807084040

Cited by 20 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In Dion et al (2016) and Atler and McGranahan (2000), reputation is one of several factors absorbed by an exogenous payoff from obstruction. Bawn and Koger (2008) explicitly associate their exogenous obstruction payoff with reputation. Fong and Krehbiel (2018) also acknowledge that signaling is relevant for explaining obstruction but do not explicitly include reputation in their model.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is related to the decision of the opposition to delay a fait accompli bill in Patty (2016). To get to this stage in my model, the 5 They remark in a footnote that signaling can be incorporated into their model by adding exogenous payoffs from the act of obstructing itself (Fong and Krehbiel, 2018, p. 3) as in Bawn and Koger (2008).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster

Gibbs

2023

QJPS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Filibusters and efforts to defeat them shape the public reputation of U.S. senators and their parties. I develop a formal model to study how senators' concerns about their own and the opposing party's reputation influence their behavior in the Senate. In the model, a majority and opposition party bargain over policy. Each party earns a reputation with a core primary constituency which observes legislative bargaining and forms beliefs about its party's policy priorities. Filibusters and attempts to defeat them are costly and can therefore credibly signal that a party values a particular issue. I identify conditions under which parties use these costly procedural moves to preserve or enhance their reputation when the costs of obstruction deter purely policy-motivated parties from filibustering or attempting to defeat a filibuster. Alternatively, under certain conditions parties strategically choose not to pursue policy victories that they otherwise would either to protect their own reputation with a constituency that values other issues more highly or to deny the opposing party the opportunity to signal. I examine the model's empirical implications for the relative frequency of filibusters, cloture votes, and tabling motions and identify conditions under which the Senate is endogenously supermajoritarian.

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster

Gibbs

2023

QJPS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Voting as a war of attrition

Kwiek

Marreiros

Vlassopoulos

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare-the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay.

show abstract

A duration estimator for a continuous time war of attrition game

Boehmke

Dion

Shipan

2020

PSRM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract We developed a maximum likelihood estimator corresponding to the predicted hazard rate that emerges from a continuous time game of incomplete information with a fixed time horizon (i.e., Kreps and Wilson, 1982, Journal of Economic Theory27, 253–279). Such games have been widely applied in economics and political science and involve two players engaged in a war of attrition contest over some prize that they both value. Each player can be either a strong or weak competitor. In the equilibrium of interest, strong players do not quit whereas weak players play a mixed strategy characterized by a hazard rate that increases up to an endogenous point in time, after which only strong players remain. The observed length of the contest can therefore be modeled as a mixture between two unobserved underlying durations: one that increases until it abruptly ends at an endogenous point in time and a second involving two strong players that continues indefinitely. We illustrate this estimator by studying the durations of Senate filibusters and international crises.

show abstract

Effort, Intensity and Position Taking

Cited by 20 publications

References 27 publications

The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster

The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster

Voting as a war of attrition

A duration estimator for a continuous time war of attrition game

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About