Effort rights‐based management

Abstract

Effort rights‐based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM is discussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade‐offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by‐catch and the ecosystem.

New tuna regimes

“…It is well understood that sustainability and equity can be achieved through better cooperation and adequate management strategies, through efficient institutions (Squires et al 2016). Efficient institutions are those that can facilitate coordination between dynamic actors and interests toward a common goal (Hilborn et al 2005).…”

“…This refers to the role of so called 'governance institutions' in organising and enforcing management measures through appropriate regimes, contracts and agreements (Williamson 2000, Pacheco et al 2010. Appropriate regimes refer to implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures, that incorporate incentive schemes that can influence individual choices to secure collective welfare and improve collective participation , Pacheco et al 2010, Kozenkow 2013, Squires et al 2016.…”

“…To further understand the central problem associated with this diversity of interests, we now turn to a short review of four key inefficiencies that characterise 'old' tuna regimes in the context of the WCPO: (1) weak political institution to enforce property rights (Barclay et al 2007, Langley et al 2009, Havice 2010, (2) compliance issues in relation to regime ineffectiveness (Langley et al 2009, Pintassilgo et al 2010, (3) asymmetric information and incentive gaps (Beddington et al 2007, Vestergaard 2010, Banks et al 2012, Jensen et al 2013, and (4) inadequate incentives for fishers and managers to promote precautionary management approaches (Hilborn et al 2005, Squires et al 2016). …”

“…Overfishing, overfished stocks and overcapitalization of fishing fleets are functions of the success or failure of inadequate institutions (Squires et al 2016). Rules for the exploitation of trans-boundary fish stocks like tuna are set by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), with authority mandated through the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).…”

“…Under the international laws (UNCLOS), RFMOs are expected to establish appropriate management measures in line with precautionary sustainability approaches. Despite the achievement RFMOs represent as international platforms for the management of tuna resources, their effectiveness in setting and enforcing effective effort limits and rules for harvesting tuna (even when measured against their own goals) has been limited by the difficulty of aligning political and economic interests of member states , Squires et al 2016. In light of RFMO's delayed actions in reaching for appropriate agreements in promoting sustainability for trans-boundary tuna resources, this chapter examines the role of smart mixes or mixed approaches in facilitating regulatory systems at the RFMO level.…”