2007
DOI: 10.1038/nature05651
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Egalitarian motives in humans

Abstract: Participants in laboratory games are often willing to alter others' incomes at a cost to themselves, and this behaviour has the effect of promoting cooperation. What motivates this action is unclear: punishment and reward aimed at promoting cooperation cannot be distinguished from attempts to produce equality. To understand costly taking and costly giving, we create an experimental game that isolates egalitarian motives. The results show that subjects reduce and augment others' incomes, at a personal cost, eve… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

23
385
1
6

Year Published

2007
2007
2020
2020

Publication Types

Select...
10

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 533 publications
(415 citation statements)
references
References 13 publications
23
385
1
6
Order By: Relevance
“…Recently, the Public Good experiment with Punishment was repeated, with the difference that the first stage (public good) was replaced by a lottery [63]. Players received randomly assigned sums (distributed as in the Fehr-Gächter experiment [4]) and then could inflict costly 'punishment' just as before, except that they were fully aware that their coplayers had done nothing wrong.…”
Section: Proximate Causes Of Costly Punishmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recently, the Public Good experiment with Punishment was repeated, with the difference that the first stage (public good) was replaced by a lottery [63]. Players received randomly assigned sums (distributed as in the Fehr-Gächter experiment [4]) and then could inflict costly 'punishment' just as before, except that they were fully aware that their coplayers had done nothing wrong.…”
Section: Proximate Causes Of Costly Punishmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is an even more striking fact that humans consider a given amount of resources perfectly satisfactory unless someone else gets less, in which case again they often find that amount unsatisfactory. In the language of economics, humans are averse to inequity-in both advantageous and disadvantageous directions (e.g., Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2007;Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Otra posible interpretación de este resultado es que los agentes, además de evitar el castigo y ganar el premio, hayan intentado también satisfacer el objetivo de ganar más dinero que la otra persona, lo cual los impulsaba a no bajar demasiado sus elecciones. Un grupo importante, aunque menor (alrededor del 35%), elige exactamente el mismo número que el otro participante, probablemente con alguna motivación de tipo igualitarista, lo cual se ha registrado en otros juegos como el ultimátum (Dawes et al, 2007). Otra posible interpretación para el comportamiento de este grupo es que sean del grupo competitivo que simplemente quieren evitar el castigo, aunque sin por eso sacrificar en demasía su ganancia monetaria.…”
Section: Resumen Del Experimento 2: Aspecto Cognitivounclassified