Egalitarian solutions in the core

Arin, Javier; Iñarra, Elena

doi:10.1007/s001820100073

Cited by 51 publications

(50 citation statements)

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“…As a consequence, the latter type of egalitarian allocation exists for a given game precisely when the core of the game is not empty. Arin and Iñarra (2001) showed that their definition coincides with the definition in Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games. This, together with the guarantee of existence for a relatively large and manageable class of games, makes the notion of Arin and Iñarra an interesting alternative for the notion of Dutta and Ray.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…For example, Arin and Iñarra (2001) introduced the lexmax and the lexmin concept. The definition of these concepts is as follows.…”

Section: Some Egalitarian Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, they present two examples, one showing that the egalitarian allocation may exist for games with an empty core and another one showing that the egalitarian allocation need not be a core element even if the core is not empty. Arin and Iñarra (2001) used another definition of egalitarian allocations. The difference does not lie in the notion of egalitarianism, 2 but in a the notion of stability they use.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dutta and Ray (1989) define stability of a given allocation recursively, by requiring that no coalition can object to it using an allocation that is both stable with respect to the coalition and better for all of its members. Arin and Iñarra (2001) require that the allocation be in the core of the game. As a consequence, the latter type of egalitarian allocation exists for a given game precisely when the core of the game is not empty.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games

2008

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A core concept is a solution concept on the class of balanced games that exclusively selects core allocations. We show that every continuous core concept that satisfies both the equal treatment property and a new property called independence of irrelevant core allocations (IIC) necessarily selects egalitarian allocations. IIC requires that, if the core concept selects a certain core allocation for a given game, and this allocation is still a core allocation for a new game with a core that is contained in the core of the first game, then the core concept also chooses this allocation as the solution to the new game. When we replace the continuity requirement by a weak version of additivity we obtain an axiomatization of the egalitarian solution concept that assigns to each balanced game the core allocation minimizing the Euclidean distance to the equal share allocation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…For example, Arin and Iñarra (2001) introduced the lexmax and the lexmin concept. The definition of these concepts is as follows.…”

Section: Some Egalitarian Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games

2008

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“…Branzei, Dimitrov, and Tijs (2006) extended the computational algorithm for locating the constrained egalitarian solution of convex games to superadditive games by introducing the equal split-off set. Arin and Iñarra (2001) applied an egalitarian criterion to the core of balanced games by introducing the egalitarian core which satisfies the consistency property for reduced games of Davis and Maschler (1965). Both the equal split-off set and the egalitarian core coincide with the constrained egalitarian solution on the class of convex games.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

2016

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In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game.

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Koster

2009

Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

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Egalitarian solutions in the core

Cited by 51 publications

References 1 publication

An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games

An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games

The Procedural Egalitarian Solution

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