Einführung in die formale Logik für Philosophen

“…They have a different logical form. [17] (41) 8 One axiom of the modal system S5 is that something that is possible is necessarily possible (♦p → ♦p). The necessary conditionality is expressed by the role the antecedent and the consequent play in the truth values of the conditional.…”

Section: Limits Of Labelingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inferences and Modal Vocabulary

Richter

2020

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Deduction is the one of the major forms of inferences and commonly used in formal logic. This kind of inference has the feature of monotonicity, which can be problematic. There are different types of inferences that are not monotonic, e.g. abductive inferences. The debate between advocates and critics of abduction as a useful instrument can be reconstructed along the issue, how an abductive inference warrants to pick out one hypothesis as the best one. But how can the goodness of an inference be assessed? Material inferences express good inferences based on the principle of material incompatibility. Material inferences are based on modal vocabulary, which enriches the logical expressivity of the inferential relations. This leads also to certain limits in the application of labeling in machine learning. I propose a modal interpretation of implications to express conceptual relations.1 This paper is based on a talk that I gave at the International Conference on Information and Computer Technologies (ICICT 2020) in San Jose.2 Charles Sanders Peirce thinks that a perceptual judgment is really an abductive inference, that can be made explicit.[10] (CP 5.3) In epistemological debates in philosophy it is an extensively discussed topic, whether to perceive something is to draw an inference or not.

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“…An analogy of a card game might be helpful to explain the idea of possible worlds and the epistemic accesibility. [28] (132) A player knows her own cards, but does not know the cards of all the other players, although it might be, that the player knows some cards of other players (epistemically accesible worlds) and it is possible for the player to imagine some cards of the other players (counterfactual possible worlds). If she knows her own cards, then this could also count as a certain kind of consciousness of her own (epistemic) states.…”

Section: Modal Logicmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logic, Language, and Calculus

Richter¹

2020

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The difference between object-language and metalanguage is crucial for logical analysis, but has yet not been examined for the field of computer science. In this paper the difference is examined with regard to inferential relations. It is argued that inferential relations in a metalanguage (like a calculus for propositional logic) cannot represent conceptual relations of natural language. Inferential relations govern our concept use and understanding. Several approaches in the field of Natural Language Understanding (NLU) and Natural Language Inference (NLI) take this insight in account, but do not consider, how an inference can be assessed as a good inference. I present a logical analysis that can assesss the normative dimension of inferences, which is a crucial part of logical understanding and goes beyond formal understanding of metalanguages.

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Einführung in die formale Logik für Philosophen

Cited by 5 publications

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Bilder, soziale Medien und das Politische

Bilder, soziale Medien und das Politische

Inferences and Modal Vocabulary

Logic, Language, and Calculus

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