Einleitung: Industrie-Eliten im 20. Jahrhundert*

Erker, Paul; Pierenkemper, Toni

doi:10.1524/9783486594409.1

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Ownership concentration increased through the Nazi period as (gentile) founder families were assisted in retaining control. Continuity in personnel has been demonstrated in owners 3 , managers, the chambers of commerce and industry and in the employers' and industry associations (Erker, 1999;Joly, 2000;Wiesen, 2001). Fohlin reports that ‚the deconcentration efforts of the allies in the early aftermath of World War II -both in terms of equity ownership and industrial organization -failed generally over the long run‛ (p.13).…”

Section: Property Rights Institutions and Large-scale Reform Surprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fohlin reports that ‚the deconcentration efforts of the allies in the early aftermath of World War II -both in terms of equity ownership and industrial organization -failed generally over the long run‛ (p.13). This is even the case in sectors targeted by the Allied authorities for post-war 'deconcentration' and 'denazification': steel, coal, chemicals, insurance and banks (Borkin, 1978;Erker, 1999;Feldman, 2001;Frei, 2003;Horstmann, 1991;Pohl, 1974). With owners and managers largely in place, investment decisions were made once expropriation by the state had been ruled out, functioning money was again available, and prices could be set to deliver the required profit margins.…”

Section: Property Rights Institutions and Large-scale Reform Surprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Institutions and Economic Reforms

Carlin

2010

REI

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Recent studies in economic development seek to establish that institutional quality is an important determinant of long-run living standards. Moreover, it appears that property rights institutions are causal for development whereas contracting institutions affect the nature of financial intermediation in the economy. I use these results to explore two questions. If property rights institutions matter for economic growth, can they help explain large-scale reform surprises? The reforms in Western Germany in 1948 are viewed as 'miraculous' whereas those in the early 1990s in the former Soviet transition economies are viewed as disappointing. I argue that the former had a limited task because they only had to restore existing property rights institutions whereas the latter had to create new ones and find new owners for assets. The second question is whether the persistence of variety in contracting institutions across countries that have developed successfully has implications for the design of financial and corporate governance reforms.JEL classification: P11, P14, P21

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Section: Property Rights Institutions and Large-scale Reform Surprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Property Rights Institutions and Large-scale Reform Surprisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions and Economic Reforms

Carlin

2010

REI

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“…Die Zielvorstellung oder der normative Rahmen, an dem sich die politische Kultur der Bundesrepublik und das wie auch immer vage formulierte Programm der 6 Prowe 1985;Schneider 1998Schneider (zuerst 1993; Rauh-Kühne 1998; Erker 1998;Wiesen 2001, 179-200. Mit dem kulturpolitischen Engagement und Mäzenatentum einzelner Wirtschaftsführer bzw. industrieller (Dach-)Verbände wurde darüber hinaus ein Feld analysiert, das sich gerade außerhalb der engen wirtschaftlichen Handlungssphäre ansiedelte.…”

Section: Verbraucherdemokratieunclassified