Einstein’s Theory of Theories and Mechanicism

Maltrana, D. Romero; Herrera, Manuel; Benitez, Federico

doi:10.1080/02698595.2022.2130661

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Felline (2011) discusses this in the case of special relativity, but many of the points she makes are general and can be aligned with the distinction between structural and mechanistic explanations. Quickly stated, framework theories explain structurally, whereas interaction theories explain by giving mechanisms (see also Maltrana et al, 2022, for a recent attempt to reintroduce Flores' classification along these lines).…”

Section: The Framework/interaction Distinctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both in Einstein and in Flores, the concept of a framework or principle theory refers to universally valid theories behind every phenomena, that is, theories that describe the structure of reality at its most fundamental level. Thus, whereas the framework/interaction classification can be extended to the special sciences, it is not without dealing with some subtle points that go beyond the scope of this work (for an analysis in this direction, see Maltrana et al, 2022).…”

Section: Realism About Objects and Realism About Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Structural realism and theory classification

Benitez

2023

Theoria

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Ontic structural realism constitutes a promising take on scientific realism, one that avoids the well‐known issues that realist stances have with underdetermination and theory change. In its most radical versions, ontic structural realism proposes a type of eliminativism about theoretical entities, ascribing ontological commitment only to the structures, and not to the objects appearing in our theories. More moderate versions of ontic structural realism have also been proposed, allowing for ‘thin’ objects in the ontology. This work connects these takes on structural realism with the independent notion that there are two categorically different kinds of scientific theories, namely those that deal with interactions and those that deal with structural constraints – what are known as interaction and framework theories, respectively. By taking this classification seriously, one can arrive at a selective version of ontic structural realism which is better adapted to our scientific knowledge, in which eliminativist ontic structural realism constitutes a natural fit to framework theories, whereas the moderate version is connected to interaction theories.

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Section: The Framework/interaction Distinctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Realism About Objects and Realism About Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural realism and theory classification

Benitez

2023

Theoria

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“…He thought that framework theories are principle theories while interaction theories include a larger set of theories than constructive theories. Furthermore, he connected framework theories with unification and interaction theories with mechanistic explanation (see also [5,6]).…”

Section: Constructive Explanations Principle Theories Interactions An...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Many-Worlds: Why Is It Not the Consensus?

Allori

2023

Quantum Reports

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In this paper, I argue that the many-worlds theory, even if it is arguably the mathematically most straightforward realist reading of quantum formalism, even if it is arguably local and deterministic, is not universally regarded as the best realist quantum theory because it provides a type of explanation that is not universally accepted. Since people disagree about what desiderata a satisfactory physical theory should possess, they also disagree about which explanatory schema one should look for in a theory, and this leads different people to different options.

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Particles, fields, and the ontology of the standard model

Benitez

2023

Synthese

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In this work we discuss issues of ontological commitment towards one of the most important examples of contemporary fundamental science: the standard model of particle physics. We present a new form of selective structural realism, which uses as its basis the distinction between what have been called framework and interaction theories. This allows us to advance the ongoing debate about the ontological status of (quasi-)particles and quantum fields, by emphasising the distinction between quantum field theory serving as a framework, and the standard model itself, which we argue is an interaction theory embedded within this framework. Following a discussion of what ontological commitments corresponds to each of these two classes, we argue that some of the previous proposals in the literature might have been misguided by the blending of quantum field theory and the standard model into an undifferentiated unity, and defend a moderate form of object realism with respect to particle-like entities.

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Einstein’s Theory of Theories and Mechanicism

Cited by 9 publications

References 37 publications

Structural realism and theory classification

Structural realism and theory classification

Many-Worlds: Why Is It Not the Consensus?

Particles, fields, and the ontology of the standard model

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