Ekonomické hlasování a odpovědnost vládních stran ve střední Evropě

Abstract

The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European Election Study data (2004 and 2009). As the results show, economic voting was only detected in Hungary (2004 and 2009) and Slovakia (2004). The analysis indicates that, in general, almost all Prime ministers’ parties bear a greater degree of economic accountability; meanwhile, perceptions of EU economic responsibility had no influence on the popularity of government parties in 2009.

Distribution of Seats in the New 2021 Czech Government Coalition in Terms of Coalition Theories and Power Indices of Political Parties

“…In the opinion of the author, in the case of the Czech government coalition, it also turned out that the application of the proportionality hypothesis principle is a suitable indicator for the analysis and interpretation of the distribution of governmental and parliamentary functions, when each participant entering a coalition expects that all actors will demand a share on the principle of proportionality, that is, the share they brought to the coalition (Gamson, 1961, p. 376;De Winter, 2005). The advantage of the hypothesis proved to be its straightforward empiricism and comprehensibility (Fréchette, Kagel, & Morelli, 2005;Svačinová & Chytilek, 2009), which created a suitable initial premise for the application of political circumstances that explained the distribution of seats in the Czech government.…”

“…The phenomenon of office-seeking also correlates with the type of government that is in office, making it essential to consider typologies of government coalitions. Czech political scientists have explored this issue both from a theoretical perspective (see Klíma, 1998;Fiala, 2003;Říchová, 2006;Just, 2012;Cabada, Charvát, & Stulík, 2015) and in case studies analyzing executive coalitions (Balík, 2006;Švec, 2010;Svačinová & Chytilek, 2009;Charvátová, 2020). From the perspective of power indices for political parties (the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices), there has also been an analysis of the distribution of government and parliamentary positions in the period 1992-2009 (Svačinová & Chytilek, 2009).…”

“…Czech political scientists have explored this issue both from a theoretical perspective (see Klíma, 1998;Fiala, 2003;Říchová, 2006;Just, 2012;Cabada, Charvát, & Stulík, 2015) and in case studies analyzing executive coalitions (Balík, 2006;Švec, 2010;Svačinová & Chytilek, 2009;Charvátová, 2020). From the perspective of power indices for political parties (the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices), there has also been an analysis of the distribution of government and parliamentary positions in the period 1992-2009 (Svačinová & Chytilek, 2009). An innovative approach comes from political economics, in a study focusing on the concentration of political power in the Prague City Assembly and mayoral team.…”

“…When involved in coalition negotiations, political parties choose strategies with regard to their input conditions and political preferences (Strøm, 1990;Svačinová & Chytilek, 2009). The rationality of actors is associated with their expectation that they possess complete information about the other actors, and that this information is mutually shared.…”

“…Other widely used indices, named after their originators, are the Johnston, Coleman, Deegan-Packel and Banzhaf power indices. A full overview of the various power indices used in political science research can be found in a large body of literature (Deegan & Packel, 1978;Straffin, 1994;Felenstahl & Machover, 2004;Turnovec, 2007;Pacelli & Taylor, 2008;Svačinová & Chytilek, 2009;Dlouhý & Fiala, 2015).…”