El Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructura apuntando al camino del medio: uniéndose a las filas de los Bancos Multilaterales de Desarrollo, pero con características chinas

Abstract

En junio del 2016 fue aprobado el primer proyecto del Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructura y una de las preocupaciones de los expertos es que esta nueva institución puede ser flexible con respecto a las condiciones de los préstamos y salvaguardas, argumentando que los creadores de este banco carecen de experiencia suficiente para mantener altos estándares establecidos por los otros bancos multilaterales. En contraste, otros especialistas destacan que la participación de China en el financiamiento a nivel internacional no es nada nuevo. Durante la última década, China ha permitido que los bancos de desarrollo estatales otorguen créditos no concesionales. Este artículo analiza ambos enfoques y los contrasta con un análisis comparativo del diseño de los bancos de desarrollo regionales y el nuevo banco multilateral liderado por China. Además, analiza la orientación de las políticas de crédito y salvaguardas de los 21 primeros proyectos aprobados por AIIB hasta el 2017. El nuevo banco esta apuntando al camino del medio: por un lado, uniéndose a las filas de los principales bancos multilaterales, pero al mismo tiempo, tratando de ser una institución con una visión sur a sur: ágil, respetando las políticas internas de cada país y enfocada en el nicho de los proyectos de infraestructura. 
 
 In June 2016 the first project of the AIIB was approved and some experts' concern is if this new institution can be flexible with respect to the conditions of the loans and safeguards, arguing that the creators of this bank lack enough experience to maintain high standards established by the other multilateral banks. In contrast, other specialists point out that China's participation in financing at an international level is nothing new. Over the past decade, China has allowed state development banks to grant non-concessional loans. This article analyzes both approaches and contrasts them with a comparative analysis of the design of the regional development banks and the new multilateral bank led by China. In addition, it analyzes the orientation of the credit policies and safeguards of the first 21 projects approved by AIIB until 2017. The new bank is treading the middle path: on the one hand, joining the ranks of the main multilateral banks, but at the same time, trying to be an institution with a south-south vision: agile, respecting the internal policies of each country and focused on the niche of infrastructure projects.

The accession of Latin American countries to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: lessons from Brazil and Chile

“…Among them, the most commonly cited are to help promote China's influence in the Asian region and beyond, to weaken the US dominance in the regional and global economy and minimize the effects of Washington's policy of containing China (Cai, 2018, p. 834), to export China's industrial overcapacity and tackle the domestic slowdown of its economy (Chen and Liu, 2018, pp. 795–796), to use the bank as a soft power and status-seeking tool (Wilson, 2017), to assume a responsible role as an international power and provide global public goods (Gu, 2017), to reform multilateral development banking (taken together with the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the reallocation of votes within the IMF)(Borquéz, 2019) and to “help to integrate China's domestic financial system, and in particular its green financial markets, into related world financial markets” (De Jonge, 2017, p. 1064). These reasons are not mutually exclusive since the AIIB may serve all these purposes simultaneously.…”

O AIIB e a securitização do desenvolvimento: a transposição da ameaça chinesa para o financiamento multilateral | The AIIB and the securitization of development: the transposition of the chinese threat to multilateral financing

“…13, e61502, 202213, e61502, . DOI: 10.12957/rmi.2022.61502| e-ISSN: 2177-7314 (Spellmann, 2020, p. 161) e ocupando uma posição político-econômica estratégica para a China (Zhu, 2019;Borquez, Naru, 2019).…”