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Gallo, Joseph C.; Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G.; Craycraft, Joseph L.; Parker, Charles J.

doi:10.1023/a:1007865923061

Cited by 54 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…196.58 If we combine PUNISHMENT with EXCLUSION we can compare our sample to previous studies. Forty-three percent of cartels in our sample use some form of disciplinary or exclusionary tactics, compared to a range of five to twelve percent reported in previous samples(Hay and Kelley 1974;Fraas and Greer 1977;Posner 1970;Gallo et al 2000). We do not believe that contemporary cartels use punishments and exclusionary tactics more frequently than…”

contrasting

confidence: 61%

“…Cross-section studies of international cartels covering the late 19 th and 20 th centuries find duration estimates of between 5.3 and 8.3 years ( Table 1). The U.S. studies are similar, with Posner (1970) and Gallo et al (2000) finding that the average duration of cartels prosecuted by the U.S. government was 7.5 and 5.4 years, respectively. In studies including a measure of variance, the variance in cartel duration is high.…”

Section: Hazard Modelmentioning

confidence: 64%

“…Hay and Kelley (1974) find that 29% of the cartels in their sample involved trade associations. Fraas and Greer (1977), Posner (1970), and Gallo et al (2000) report 39%, 44%, and 23% respectively. 53 This has been true of international cartels in the past.…”

Section: Preventing Cheatingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration

Levenstein

Suslow

2010

SSRN Journal

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We estimate the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations and industry structure, on cartel duration using a dataset of contemporary international cartels. We estimate a proportional hazards model with competing risks, distinguishing factors which increase the risk of "death by antitrust" from those that affect "natural death," including defection, dissension or entry. Our analysis indicates that the probability of cartel death from any cause increased significantly after 1995 when competition authorities expanded enforcement efforts toward international cartels. We find that fluctuations in firm-specific discount rates have a significant effect on cartel duration, whereas market interest rates do not. Cartels with a compensation scheme-a plan for how the cartel will handle variations in demand-are significantly less likely to break up. In contrast, retaliatory punishments in response to perceived cheating significantly increase the likelihood of natural death. Cartels that have to punish are not stable cartels.

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contrasting

confidence: 61%

Section: Hazard Modelmentioning

confidence: 64%

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Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration

Levenstein

Suslow

2010

SSRN Journal

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“…Forty-three percent of cartels in our sample use some form of disciplinary or exclusionary tactics, compared to a range of 5-12 percent reported in previous samples (Hay and Kelley 1974;Fraas and Greer 1977;Posner 1970;Gallo et al 2000). We do not believe that contemporary cartels use punishments and exclusionary tactics more frequently than those in the past.…”

Section: Preventing Cheatingcontrasting

confidence: 58%

“…16 Average cartel duration does not appear to have changed substantially over the past century. Cross-sectional studies of international cartels covering the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries give duration estimates of between 5.3 and (1970) and Gallo et al (2000) finding, respectively, that the average duration of cartels prosecuted by the U.S. government is 7.5 and 5.4 years. In studies including a measure of variance, the variance in cartel duration is high.…”

Section: Sample Of Contemporary International Cartels and Variable Dementioning

confidence: 99%

Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration

Levenstein

Suslow

2011

The Journal of Law and Economics

132

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . AbstractWe estimate the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations and industry structure, on cartel duration using a data set of contemporary international cartels. We estimate a proportional hazards model with competing risks, distinguishing factors that increase the risk of "death by antitrust" from those that affect natural death, including defection, dissension, and entry. Our analysis indicates that the probability of cartel death from any cause increased significantly after 1995, when competition authorities expanded enforcement efforts toward international cartels. We find that fluctuations in firm-specific discount rates have a significant effect on cartel duration, whereas market interest rates do not. Cartels with a compensation scheme-a plan for how the cartel will handle variations in demand-are significantly less likely to break up. In contrast, retaliatory punishments in response to perceived cheating significantly increase the likelihood of natural death. Cartels that have to punish are not stable cartels.

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Ökonomik der Kartelle und Kartellverfolgung

Hüschelrath

2020

Kartelle Klipp &Amp; Klar

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Cited by 54 publications

References 27 publications

Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration

Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration

Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration

Ökonomik der Kartelle und Kartellverfolgung

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