Elections and Ethnic Civil War

Abstract

Existing research on how democratization may influence the risk of civil war tends to consider only changes in the overall level of democracy and rarely examines explicitly the postulated mechanisms relating democratization to incentives for violence. The authors argue that typically highlighted key mechanisms imply that elections should be especially likely to affect ethnic groups' inclination to resort to violence. Distinguishing between types of conflict and the order of competitive elections, the authors find that ethnic civil wars are more likely to erupt after competitive elections, especially after first and second elections following periods of no polling. When disaggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups and conflicts over territory or government, the authors find some support for the notion that ethno-nationalist mobilization and sore-loser effects provoke postelectoral violence. More specifically, although large groups in general are more likely to engage in governmental conflicts, they are especially likely to do so after noncompetitive elections. Competitive elections, however, strongly reduce the risk of conflict.

Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa

“…18 Brancati and Snyder 2013;Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug 2012;Flores and Noourdin 2012;Snyder 2000. 19 Bekoe 2012Höglund 2009.…”

Elections and Civil War in Africa

“…More specifically, Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug (2012) analyze a global sample from 1960 to 2000 and find that competitive elections, particularly first and second elections, increase the likelihood of ethnic civil conflicts. Their analysis includes both minor conflicts that followed competitive elections (e.g., Niger and Chad in the mid-1990s) as well as major civil wars (e.g., Congo in 1993).…”

Democratization and armed conflicts in post-cold war Africa (1989-2012)

“…In analyzing the contexts of conflict of the four cases, we find in each one of them the following conditions, which have been also identified by other scholars as highly conducive to conflicts: overlapping or reinforcing social cleavages, (Goodin, 1975;Lijphart, 2012;Lijphart, 1975; (Cederman et al, 2013;Daxecker, 2007;Mansfield and Snyder 2002). In the case of Algeria, the religious cleavage between Islamists and secularists was reinforced by a socioeconomic cleavage between the poor and less educated majority, on the one hand, and the elite, well-educated and rich minority, on the other hand.…”

“…Furthermore, others scholars argue that democratization per se may not be the problem, but democratization in combination with other factors or conditions, such as elections, ethnic nationalism, nationalist rhetoric, political uncertainty, etc (Cederman et al, 2013;Mansfield and Snyder, 2005;Savun and Tirone, 2011 (Cederman et al, 2013).…”