Elections inWesternEuropean parliaments

Abstract

Parliaments often elect holders of important extra‐parliamentary offices such as heads of state, constitutional judges, heads of audit institutions and ombudsmen. What drives the behaviour of parliamentary actors and the outcome of such elections? This article explains actor behaviour theoretically, drawing on spatial factors, principal‐agent arguments about the importance of nonspatial candidate characteristics and signaling arguments about competitive considerations beyond the specific election. Empirically, it provides the first comparative analysis of such elections outside the United States Senate using original data on 100 elections for four external offices in 14 Western European parliaments. The findings show that spatial variables, nonspatial candidate characteristics and features of the competitive context systematically affect the election outcome. The article contributes to comparative parliamentary research in general by demonstrating how parliamentary activities, other than lawmaking, can be analysed using established theories and by showing that consensual aggregate outcomes can be explained within a competition‐based rational choice model.

Risk vs Reward Strategies in Indirect Presidential Elections: Political Parties and the Selection of Presidential Electors in Germany, 1949–2017

“…Scholars have also repeatedly emphasized the 'signalling power' of the presidential election in paving the way for a new coalition government (Billing, 1995;Decker and Jesse, 2013;see also Oppeland, 2001;Sieberer, 2013). While parties generally seem to have placed greater emphasis on such signals as warranted by their effect (Decker and Jesse, 2013), the elections' publicity value for political parties should not be underestimated.…”

“…The election puts candidates -and their parties -in the spotlight, so that all parties proposing a candidate (even those with no chance of winning) benefit from increased media attention. Last, although authors have hitherto failed to make this connection, the potential for majorities that do not include (all) government parties in its composition challenges conventional assumptions that indirect presidential elections may 'reflect the parliamentary balance of powers rather than chang[e] it' (Schleiter and Morgan Jones, 2009, 508: see also Sieberer, 2013). Overall, the German case therefore supports Nikolenyi's (2014) assertion that government coalitions are less likely to capture the presidency if the rules for its selection diverge from those for electing the prime minister.…”

“…At the same time, these elections are publicly observed events and the process in itself may be almost as valuable to political parties as the eventual result (cf. Decker and Jesse 2013; Ganghof and Bäuninger 2006;Sieberer 2013). The question of when and why parties nominate EPEs is emblematic of the tension between these competing goals -EPEs may put the election of party's preferred candidate at risk, yet simultaneously offer the most efficient way to capitalise fully on the high-profile nature of the election.…”

“…However, competition is not solely motivated by parties' desire to determine the next president. Presidential elections are also publicly observed and debated events -they allow parties to send specific policy signals to voters as well as position themselves with regard to upcoming elections (Decker and Jesse, 2013;Sieberer, 2013). Thus, these elections serve a dual purpose and require careful strategizing by political parties.…”

Is there a ‘German school’ of comparative politics? An institutional perspective

“…While an impressionistic overview shows that a substantial number of German scholars publish comparative work on legislative politics in international journals (see, for example, Bowler et al 2016;Bräuninger et al 2016;Koß 2015;Fortunato et al 2013;Saalfeld and Bischof 2013;Sieberer 2013;Stecker and Tausendpfund 2016;Goetz 2015, 2017), a more rigorous examination is necessary to establish, first, the extent to which Germanybased (and German-speaking) scholars write solely for their home audience, or whether they engage with an international audience as well, and second, the extent to which German and Germany-based scholars engage in comparative research on legislative politics.…”