Elections Under Authoritarianism

Gandhi, Jennifer; Lust, Ellen

doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434

Cited by 730 publications

(358 citation statements)

References 82 publications

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“…6-7) hold that an Bout-of sequence^push to hold competitive elections in culturally diverse societies without reasonably effective institutions is likely to fail and even lead to violence. Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) also suggest that multiparty elections may stabilize and legitimize dictatorships if introduced before full competition is institutionalized. Yet, Carothers (2007, pp.…”

Section: Theorizing Sequences Of Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

2018

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Accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance. Establishing accountable governments is a top priority on the international development agenda. Yet, scholars and democracy practitioners know little about how accountability mechanisms develop and thus can be supported by international and national actors. The present study tackles the questions of how, and in what sequence accountability sub-types develop. We consider not only vertical (elections and political parties) and horizontal accountability (legislature, judiciary, and other oversight bodies) but also diagonal accountability (civil society and media) in both their de-jure and the de-facto dimensions. By utilizing novel sequencing methods, we study their sequential relationships in 173 countries from 1900 to the present with data from the new V-Dem dataset. Considering the long-term dimensions of institution building, this study indicates that most aspects of de-facto vertical accountability precede other forms of accountability. Effective institutions of horizontal accountability-such as vigorous parliaments and independent high courts-evolve rather late in the sequence and build on progress in many other areas.Keywords Accountability . Sequencing . Democratization . Government oversight . De-facto power Political accountability is both one of the cornerstones of good governance and a key topic in academia. This power of the people to hold political leaders to account is fundamental to representative democracy, hence a key feature of most definitions of democracy (e.g., Dahl 1971Dahl , 1989Schmitter and Karl 1991). It is also a top priority on St Comp Int Dev (2019) 54:40-70 https://doi.org/10.1007 Authors contributed equally and are listed in reverse alphabetical order. * Valeriya MechkovaValeriya.mechkova@gu.se 1 V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden the international development agenda, e.g., as a target of the Sustainable Development Goals (UN Resolution: A/Res/70/1). Yet, we know little about how and in what sequence different aspects of accountability evolve. The extant literature provides some suggestions on the sequence of democratization-thus how accountability starts to evolve. Dahl (1971) famously argued that it is conducive if competition among elites evolves before the expansion of participation, and there is some empirical support for this (Wilson 2015, p. 234). And while there are contributions on how one aspect of accountability may strengthen other aspects (e.g., Keane 2009), this study is the first of its kind by investigating if there are generalizable sequences in the evolution of accountability across 35 highly specific institutions with data covering 176 countries and 113 years.Taking Dahl's (1971) famous axiom as a point of departure, we argue that governments are more likely to allow for de-facto accountability if the costs of supplying accountability decrease and the costs of suppressing the demand for accountability increase. Distinguishing between i...

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Section: Theorizing Sequences Of Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

2018

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“…In an electoral autocracy, these institutions are de-facto undermined such that electoral accountability is evaded (Diamond, 2002;Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009;Levitsky & Way, 2010;Schedler, 2002Schedler, , 2013. They thus fall short of democratic standards due to significant irregularities, limitations on party competition, or other violations of Dahl's institutional requisites.…”

Section: The Row Typologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes

Lührmann

Tannenberg

Lindberg

2018

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Classifying political regimes has never been more difficult. Most contemporary regimes hold de-jure multiparty elections with universal suffrage. In some countries, elections ensure that political rulers are-at least somewhat-accountable to the electorate whereas in others they are a mere window dressing exercise for authoritarian politics. Hence, regime types need to be distinguished based on the de-facto implementation of democratic institutions and processes. Using V-Dem data, we propose with Regimes of the World (RoW) such an operationalization of four important regime types-closed and electoral autocracies; electoral and liberal democracies-with vast coverage (almost all countries from 1900 to 2016). We also contribute a solution to a fundamental weakness of extant typologies: The unknown extent of misclassification due to uncertainty from measurement error. V-Dem's measures of uncertainty (Bayesian highest posterior densities) allow us to be the first to provide a regime typology that distinguishes cases classified with a high degree of certainty from those with "upper" and "lower" bounds in each category. Finally, a comparison of disagreements with extant datasets (7%-12% of the country-years), demonstrates that the RoW classification is more conservative, classifying regimes with electoral manipulation and infringements of the political freedoms more frequently as electoral autocracies, suggesting that it better captures the opaqueness of contemporary autocracies.

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“…They also lead to high levels of elite competition and fragmentation over access to state resources and power (Brancati, 2011). In the redistribution of political power, incumbents and opponents have incentives to design forms of violence to assure access to power (Schedler, 2006;Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009;Arriola and Johnson, 2012). Many agents in new democracies depend on violence to create cleavages in society, which elites can manipulate.…”

Section: Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

States of Fragility 2016

2016

States of Fragility

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Elections Under Authoritarianism

Cited by 730 publications

References 82 publications

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes

States of Fragility 2016

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