Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation

Abstract

We introduce a Downsian model in which policy-relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political representation generally consists of a mixture of the delegate (no discretion) and trustee (full discretion) models. Ambiguous electoral platforms are essential for achieving beneficial representation. Nevertheless, electoral competition does not ensure optimal representation: the winning candidate's platform is generally overly ambiguous. While our theory rationalizes a positive correlation between ambiguity and electoral success, it shows that the relationship need not be causal.

Campaign Messages, Polling, and Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence

“…16 In our experiment, messages coded as "campaign promises" are arguably more precise about future intended behavior than other messages. Previous research has found that while precise messages can be viewed as signals of competence (Frenkel 2014), ambiguity is common and often not punished by voters (Kartik, Van Weelden, and Wolton 2017;Tomz and Van Houweling 2009). We find that higher-quality challengers send more precise messages (Table 8), consistent with Frenkel.…”

Rationality of Irrationality

“…C H A P T E R 8 1. Kartik, van Weelden, and Wolton (2017) suggest that the relationship between position blurring and electoral outcomes is correlational, not causal: political parties (or candidates) that lead in electoral competition both blur their positions and win elections.…”