Electoral Competition and Social Spending in the Argentine Provinces

Abstract

What is the effect of political competition on subnational social spending? Using descriptive statistics and regression models for original budget panel data for the 24 Argentine provinces between 1993 and 2009, the study finds that social spending increases the more electorally secure governors are and the longer they have been in office. It also finds that other arguments in the literature are relevant in explaining variations on types of spending, such as partisan fragmentation in the districts. The article discusses these findings for the Argentine provinces and explores their implications with regard to the debates on the effects of electoral competition and the design of social policies, especially in developing countries and federal democracies.

Do More Female Politicians Translate Into Better Health Outcomes? Gender Representation and Infant Mortality in Argentine Provinces

“…Table 2 shows that when controlling for other covariates and including province‐fixed effects, increasing one point in the level of political competition of the province is related to an increase in the rate of infant mortality of 0.14 points (SE = 0.01). Although these results contradict the expectations of literature on regimes and health, they partially add to the argument made by González (2017), who finds that social spending increases the more electorally secure governors are and the longer they have been in office. As more secure governors spend more money on social services, less competitive provinces may indeed show better health outcomes.…”

“…A possible explanation of this relationship might be related to the role of governors in deciding who is part of the party list and the stability of policies in Argentine provinces. González (2017) finds that social spending increases, the more electorally secure governors are and the longer they have been in office in each province in Argentina. This may be explained by the fact that governors with strong political support are under less pressure from their coalition partners to engage in particularistic spending and have more control of the bureaucracy and greater freedom to decide how to spend the budget (González, 2017, p. 115).…”

“…González (2017) finds that social spending increases, the more electorally secure governors are and the longer they have been in office in each province in Argentina. This may be explained by the fact that governors with strong political support are under less pressure from their coalition partners to engage in particularistic spending and have more control of the bureaucracy and greater freedom to decide how to spend the budget (González, 2017, p. 115). In contexts of more secure governors, the effect of increasing the number of seats held by women disappears.…”

“…Less competitive governments indeed may invest more in social pressing issues, as secure political environments reduce transaction costs (De Mesquita, Smith, Morrow, & Siverson, 2005). More secure governors need to spend less on private goods and are able to distribute public goods to a wider group of voters since doing so produces greater electoral benefits (González, 2017, p. 98). Conversely, in contexts of more alternation, increasing the number of women in the legislature may provide a solution to overcome unstable policies.…”

“…Since 1983, Argentina has enjoyed 36 uninterrupted years of democratic elections, the longest period of its history. Yet, not all provinces present the same level of electoral competition: some provincial regimes combine democratic institutions with practices that are clearly if subtly authoritarian (Gervasoni, 2010; Gibson, 2012; González, 2017). This, in turn, may affect women's ability to promote changes in the scope of health even more if the ways candidates are selected in Argentine parties are considered.…”